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THE FOGGY ROAD FOR EVALUATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
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I.  Introduction
In recent years, punitive damages awards have increased in 
frequency and size.3  According to one study, between 1996 and 2001, 
the annual number of punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million 
doubled and, in 2001 alone, over $162 billion in punitive damages were 
awarded at trial or affirmed on appeal.4 Indeed, the amount of some 
awards is staggering.  For example, in Pennzoil Company v. Texaco, 
Inc., a jury assessed $10 billion in punitive damages.5 This phenomenon 
has caused the United States Supreme Court to reevaluate its 
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of excessive punitive damages 
awards.6
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3
. As Justice O’Connor has pointed out:
2As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were 
“rarely assessed”  and usually “small in amount.”  
Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards 
have been skyrocketing.  One commentator notes that 
“hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar 
punitive damages verdict in a product liability case.”  
And it appears that the upward trajectory continues 
unabated.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
4
. See Richard L. Blatt, et al., Punitive Damages: A State-by-
State Guide to Law and Practice 12, 17 (2003).  In fact, the study 
reports that in 1992, there were no punitive damages awards in excess 
of $100 million, but in 2001, there were 16 such awards. Id. at 12.
5
. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).  The 
largest reported punitive damages award was in Engle v. R.J. Reynold 
Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. Cir., Dade County, 2000), where the 
jury awarded $145 billion in punitive damages.  That award, however, 
was later overturned on appeal.  See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 
2003 WL 21180319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., May 21, 2003).  In November 
2003, in Alabama v. Exxon Mobile Corp., a jury awarded $11.8 billion 
in punitive damages, which was more than 180 times the compensatory 
damages (excluding interest) and more than plaintiff had sought.  See 
Alabama v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2003 WL 2448276.
During the past decade, the Court has issued two opinions setting 
out guideposts for determining when punitive damages may be 
unconstitutionally excessive.7 In 1996, for the first time, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a state court award of punitive damages on 
the ground that the amount violated the Due Process Clause.  In BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, it articulated a test for lower courts to 
use in evaluating the constitutionality of such awards.9  The Court 
mandated consideration of three guideposts:  (1) the degree of the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the ratio between 
the harm to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s misconduct and the 
punitive damages award, and (3) the sanctions imposed or that could be 
imposed for comparable misconduct.10  However, in the years that 
followed, courts struggled to apply the guideposts in a consistent 
manner.11  Indeed, as one court noted, “[t]he role of gatekeeper over 
6
. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); 
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); 
see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Punitive damages are . . . ripe for 
reevaluation.”).
7
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575; State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520. 
8
. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
9
. See id. at 559.
10
. Id. at 575–85.
11
. See, e.g., Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 
181 F.3d 446, 450 (3d Cir. 1999); See also Colleen P. Murphy, Judgment 
4[sizeable] punitive damages verdicts is one of the most challenging 
that has been placed upon appellate judges in civil cases.”12
As a result, in 2003, the Court attempted to clarify the test in 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.13  Much of the 
Court’s focus in that case was on the first two guideposts, the degree 
of reprehensibility and the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Significantly, the Court announced that with respect to the 
as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 478 
(2000) (noting that recent cases regarding punitive damages awards 
make it “difficult to draw any meaningful line between 
unconstitutionally excessive awards and merely unreasonable ones”); E.
Burton Spence, Punitive Damages in Alabama after BMW v. Gore: Are 
Outcomes Any More Predictable?, 59 Ala. Law. 314, 315–19 (Sept. 1998) 
(discussing disparate appellate punitive damages review in Alabama 
after BMW); Note, Christine D’Ambrosia, Punitive Damages in Light of 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Cry for State Sovereignty, 5 
J.L. & Pol’y 577, 600–21 (1997) (surveying cases after BMW); Note, 
Peter J. Sajevic, Failing the Smell Test: Punitive Damage Awards Raise 
the United States Supreme Court’s Suspicious Judicial Eyebrow in BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 507, 536–49 (1996) 
(discussing BMW guideposts and noting, “the Court’s current role in 
the punitive damage arena [is] murky and vague”).  For a further 
discussion of lower courts interpretations of the BMW guidelines, see 
infra sections IV and V.
12
. Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd., 181 F.3d at 450.
13
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1513.
second guidepost, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”14
Unfortunately, State Farm failed to provide courts with a clear set of 
directions on how to apply the three guideposts.  The first guidepost, 
concerning reprehensibility, remains amorphous.  Because the Court did 
not provide a clear set of criteria to determine whether a defendant’s 
conduct justifies a certain amount of punitive damages, applying this 
guidepost is highly subjective and can lead to inconsistent decisions.  
Similarly, the second guidepost is likely to lead to inconsistent 
results because it is easy to manipulate the ratio.15 The third 
guidepost remains shrouded in fog.  Indeed, State Farm appears to 
obfuscate the purpose of the third guidepost and potentially undercut 
its usefulness, by stating that this guidepost has “less utility” than 
the others in determining whether a punitive damages award violates 
substantive due process.16  Some have erroneously interpreted the 
Court’s discussion of the third guidepost to preclude any comparison 
of punitive damages awards with criminal penalties on the ground that 
civil proceedings lack the protections afforded in criminal 
prosecutions.17
14
. See id. at 1524.
15 See infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text.
16
. See id. at 1519. 
17
. See, e.g., Cynthia T. Andreason, State Farm v. Campbell: What 
Happens Next?, 71 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2691, 2692 (May 5, 2003) (“[T]he 
Campbell Court drastically curtailed consideration of potential 
criminal penalties on the ground that cases in which punitive damages 
6We believe that the third guidepost, properly understood, is the 
guidepost best able to bring clarity to the BMW/State Farm test.  We 
propose that courts apply the third guidepost by focusing on 
comparable criminal (or civil) legislative fines and view any such 
penalties as a “presumptive limit” on punitive damages awards.  In 
other words, the highest comparable fine should be the presumptive 
limit on the punitive damages award.  If the award provided by the
jury is smaller than this presumptive limit, the third guidepost 
presents no bar to the imposition of the award.  However, the punitive 
damages award must still survive the scrutiny of the first two 
guideposts before it can pass constitutional muster.  Nevertheless, 
passing the third guidepost would often suggest a constitutionally 
permissible punitive damages award. 
If, however, a punitive damages award is larger than the 
“presumptive limit,” the third guidepost would not be satisfied.  
Failing the third guidepost would be a strong indication, but not a 
guarantee, that a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally 
excessive.  An award that fails the third guidepost and has an 
unacceptably large ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would be 
unconstitutional in virtually all cases.  If, however, a punitive 
damages award fails the third guidepost but has an acceptable ratio 
pursuant to the second guidepost, a court should concentrate on the 
first guidepost’s reprehensibility inquiry.  Because the relevant 
legislature has set a statutory maximum fine for the “presumptive 
can be awarded lack the protections that attach to criminal 
prosecutions.”).
limit,” it has indicated its view of the reprehensibility of the 
misconduct.  Therefore, it will be difficult to conclude that the 
misconduct is so reprehensible as to justify a punitive damages award 
greater than the “presumptive limit” set by the legislature. We 
believe that this conclusion is appropriate only in cases of 
overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct is outside all 
bounds of decency.
In Part II, we begin by providing an overview of punitive 
damages, including tracing the history and purpose of punitive damages 
and discussing their availability.  Part III examines the Supreme 
Court’s punitive damages cases.  It finds that in less than a decade, 
the Court has gone from imposing no constitutional restrictions on the 
awarding of punitive damages to providing both procedural and 
substantive due process limits on the awarding of punitive damages.
In Part IV, we analyze the third guidepost and determine that the 
Court’s decisions in BMW and State Farm fail to articulate either a 
coherent rationale or a workable approach for applying this factor.  
Part V details a new approach for evaluating whether a punitive 
damages award violates due process that focuses on and thus refines 
the third guidepost.  Our approach is consistent with the Court’s 
views on the subject, satisfies the due process need for notice, is 
respectful of federalism concerns, and allows for greater 
proportionality and nuance while evaluating punitive damages awards.  
Most importantly, it should be easy to apply and should result in more 
uniform decisions, thus providing considerable assistance to a 
perplexed judiciary.  Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
8II.  From Footpath to the Yellow Brick Road: Surveying Punitive 
Damages
Punitive damages are “sums awarded apart from any compensatory or 
nominal damages, usually . . . because of particularly aggravated 
misconduct on the part of the defendant.”18  They are of ancient origin 
and are authorized in the documents of many cultures, including the 
Code of Hammurabi,19 the Bible,20 the laws of the Babylonians, the 
Hittites and ancient Greeks21 and the Hindu Code of Manu.22
18
. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 204 (1973) 
(citing Restatement of Torts § 908 (1939)).  See also Charles T. 
McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 275 (1935).  Multiple 
damages are a form of punitive damages.  The authority to award 
multiple damages is typically set forth in a statute and they are 
calculated by multiplying the amount of the compensatory damages by a 
designated number.  Unlike the traditional form of punitive damages, 
multiple damages have a fixed limit and do not hinge on the 
defendant's wealth. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 453–54 (2d ed. 
1993).  The most common form of multiple damages is treble damages, 
which is calculated by multiplying the compensatory damages by three. 
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
605, 635–36 (1985).  Some courts allow recovery of both multiple 
damages and common law punitive damages.  Compare Com-Tech Assoc. v. 
Computer Assoc. Int’l, 753 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d,
938 F.2d 1574 (1991) (holding that claim for punitive damages could be 
asserted in civil action under RICO, even though treble damages are 
available) with Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. 
The most generally accepted reasons for punitive damages are to 
punish and deter certain conduct,23 particularly willful or malicious 
conduct.24  Courts and commentators have asserted that these damages 
Supp. 232, 252–53 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that punitive damages are 
not proper under RICO, since statute already provides treble damages).
19
. Code of Hammurabi § 8, reprinted in 1 Albert Kocourek & John 
Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law 391 (1915).
20
. See Exodus 22:1, 9 (King James).
21
. See H.F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive 
Law, in Cambridge Legal Essays 205–06 (1926).
22
. See The Laws of Manu in 1 Albert Kocourek & John Wigmore, 
supra note 16, at 391.  See also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (providing history of 
punitive damages).  Examples of punitive damages can also be found in 
the Torah.  See Elliot Klayman & Seth Klayman, Punitive Damages: 
Toward Torah-Based Reform, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 221, 226–40 (2001).
23
. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (“Punitive damages 
are awarded . . . ‘to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous 
conduct and to deter others like him from similar conduct in the 
future.’ ” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979));  
see also 1 Linda J. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages  § 
2.2(A)(1) (4th ed. 2000) (“The most frequently stated purpose of 
punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to 
deter him and others from similar misconduct.”).
24
. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a 
Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 648 (1980); see also David 
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also serve other functions.25  Specifically, they “vent the indignation 
of the victimized,”26 discourage the injured party from engaging in 
self-help remedies,27 and compensate victims for otherwise 
uncompensable losses,28 including litigation expenses that are not 
otherwise recoverable.29
G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 
39 Vill L. Rev. 363, 373–74 (1994).
25
. See e.g., Robert A. Klinick, Symposium: Reforming Punitive 
Damages—The Punitive Damages Debate, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 469, 470–71 
(2001); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of 
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1269, 1320–21 (1993); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in 
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–9 (1982); [author, if 
available], Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. 
Rev. 517, 520 (1957); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 
1, 61 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437–8 n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J. 
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?  Why Misunderstanding the History 
of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 163 (2003).
26
. See Michael Rustad, supra note 22 at 1320-1321. & Thomas 
Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: 
Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1320–21 (1993).
27
. See Dorsey D. Ellis, supra note 22, at 3-9.Jr., Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–9 (1982).
28
. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 
22, at 520; Sebok, supra note 22.70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 520 (1957); 
The authority to award punitive damages is governed both by state 
and federal law.30  Most states allow punitive damages,31 although the 
circumstances under which such relief may be awarded varies greatly.32
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 437–8 n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did 
Punitive Damages Do?  Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive 
Damages Matters Today, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 163 (2003).
29
. Ellis, supra note 264, at 3.
30
. See generally John J.Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive 
Damages Law & Practice § 4.01 (2d ed. 2000).
31
. The following states permit awards of punitive damages:  
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota,  Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See Blatt et al.,  supra note 
2, at § 8.
32
. See generally 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, at §§ 5.15–
5.31.   A handful of states either prohibit awards of punitive damages 
altogether, or restrict their use severely.  For example, Nebraska and 
Washington do not allow punitive damage awards.  See Miller v. 
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prod., 
436 P.2d 186 (Wash.1968).  Louisiana and Massachusetts only allow 
12 
Punitive damages have been permitted in actions involving torts, 
contracts, property, admiralty, employment, and family law.33
On the federal level, a number of statutes authorize the award of 
punitive relief for specific violations.34  The Fair Credit Reporting 
punitive damages when they are expressly authorized by statute.  See
McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383 (La. 1932), cert. 
denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Karavokiros v. Indiana Motor Bus Co., 524 
F. Supp. 385 (ED La. 1981); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 467 
N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (Mass. 1984).
33
. See 1 Schlueter & Redden, supra note 20, at  409–742 
(discussing punitive damages in property and tort actions); 2 
Schlueter & Redden, supra note 20, at 1–184 (discussing punitive 
damages in actions involving admiralty, employment, and family law).
34
. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1994) 
(“Any creditor . . . who fails to comply with any requirement imposed 
under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for 
punitive damages in an amount not greater than $10,000 . . . .”); Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994) (“The court may award to the 
plaintiff actual and punitive damages . . . .”); see also Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 581–82 (5th Cir. 
1982) (holding that treble damages are available if plaintiff can 
prove violation of the antitrust laws, cognizable injury caused by 
violation, and approximate amount of damage caused by violation), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982); Riley v. Empire Airlines, 823 F. 
Supp. 1016, 1023  (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding punitive damages available 
in action for wrongful discharge under Railway Labor Act on showing of 
Act, for example, provides that a court may award punitive damages 
when a consumer reporting agency willfully fails to comply with the 
requirements imposed by the Act.35  In addition, various other 
statutes, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)36 and the False Claims Act,37
deliberate and malicious conduct by employer intended to curb union 
activity); Woods v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 776  
(D.N.J. 1992) (ruling that language in Individual with Disabilities 
Education Act permitting court to “grant such relief as [it] 
determines appropriate” authorizes claim for punitive damages in suit 
alleging that school board wrongfully denied residential placement of 
disabled student).  Conversely, a number of federal statutes expressly 
preclude awards of punitive damages.  See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting 
the provisions of this title to tort claims, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but 
shall not be liable . . . for punitive damages.”); Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994) (stating that “a foreign state 
except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable 
for punitive damages”).
35
. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1994).
36
. See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)(1994) (imposing treble damages 
for failing to properly provide removal or remedial action upon 
release or threat of release of hazardous substance).
37
. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
14 
provide for the recovery of treble damages.38  However, some statutes 
that provide for the awarding of treble damages have been viewed as 
remedial in nature.39
With respect to determining the amount of punitive damages, the 
practice has been to give the jury broad discretion.40  Under the 
traditional approach, once a jury determines that the conduct
38
. See supra note 15 (discussing treble and multiple damages).
39
. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (providing for 
treble damages for injury to one’s business or property by reason of 
violation of antitrust laws); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) (awarding treble damages 
for injury to one’s business or property resulting from RICO 
violations); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477,  (1977) (stating that Clayton Act’s treble damages 
provision is in essence remedial); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 79,  (2002) (characterizing RICO’s treble damages 
provision as remedial in nature).
40
. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) 
(stating that, with respect to determining the amount of punitive 
damages, “[t]he discretion of the jury in such cases is not controlled 
by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such additional 
damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the 
practice”); see also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How 
Juries Decide 3 (2002) (finding that “the instructions presented to 
jurors for determination of the appropriate punitive damages verdict 
are extremely vague and employ terms that are largely undefined”).
justifies an award of punitive damages, it determines the amount, 
“consider[ing] the gravity of wrong and the need to deter similar 
conduct.”41  That determination is then reviewed by the trial judge and 
appellate courts.42
41
. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).  
Commentators also note that some states permit juries to consider, in 
determining the amount of punitive damages awarded: (1) the 
possibility of criminal punishment, (2) the amount of compensatory 
damages, and (3) the expense and attorneys’ fees incurred by the 
plaintiff.  See 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, § 5:23, at 5-175-
77.
42
. A number of states limit the amount of punitive damages that 
may be awarded.  See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-4 (1999) (stating 
that punitive damages may not be more than three times compensatory 
damages or $50,000, whichever is greater); Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code 
Ann. §41.008 (2001) (limiting punitive damages in certain actions to 
$200,000 or two times the economic damages plus up to $750,000 in 
additional non-economic damages, whichever is greater); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-38.1 (1987)  (imposing $350,000 cap on punitive damages); see 
also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.005(1) (1991) (limiting punitive damages, in 
certain cases, to three times amount of compensatory damages if 
compensatory damages are less than $100,000).   For example, Alabama 
and Georgia place a specific dollar cap on all awards of punitive 
damages at $250,000.  See Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1975); Ga. Code Ann. § 
51-12-5.1(g) (1997).  New Jersey limits punitive damages to five times 
16 
III.  Punitive Damages and the Constitution: Leaving Cruise Control to 
Steer the Ultimate Driving Machine 
For over 200 years, the Supreme Court declined to place any 
constitutional limits on jury-awards of punitive damages.43  The Court 
based this hands-off policy on the historical recognition of punitive 
damages as falling within the discretionary province of common law 
courts in the United States and England.44
The first modern case to note that the Constitution may limit 
excessive awards of punitive damages was Browning-Ferris Industries of 
compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A: 15-5.14 (1995).
43
. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 
U.S. 63,  (1919) (affirming award of $75 punitive damages and $25 in
attorneys’ fees against railroad that collected sixty-six cents more 
than normal fare from two passengers ); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 
305 (1878) (upholding punitive damage award in false imprisonment 
action); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,  (1852) (affirming 
punitive damage award against defendants in trespass action).
44
. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) 
(“[I]n England and in this country, [damages] have been allowed in 
excess of compensation, whenever malice, gross neglect, or oppression 
has caused or accompanied the commission of the injury complained 
of.”); Day, 54 U.S. at 371 (“It is a well-established principle of the 
common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case 
for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or 
vindictive damages upon a defendant . . . .”).
Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.45  In Browning-Ferris, a jury awarded 
$51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages 
against a defendant whose predatory pricing campaign violated the 
Sherman Act46 and state tort law.47  The defendant argued that the 
punitive damages award violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment.48  The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the 
clause applied only to government actions, particularly criminal 
45
. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).  See also Williams, 251 U.S. at 66–67 
(noting that states are permitted wide latitude in discretion but due 
process limits excessive awards); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. 
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1911) (upholding contested penalty award 
and noting that court’s discretion was limited to its obligation of 
administering justice); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 
76 (1907) (finding that there must be substantial foundation and basis 
for punitive damage awards).
46
. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
47
. See generally Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 261–62.  Browning-
Ferris (BFI) was the sole provider of trash-collection services in 
Burlington, Vermont, until Jacob Kelley, a former BFI district 
manager, started Kelco Disposal.  Id. at 261.  BFI attempted to force 
Kelco out of business by reducing prices by over 40%.  Id.  BFI’s 
regional vice president ordered BFI to “[s]quish [Kelley] like a bug.”
Id.
48
. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”).
18 
prosecutions and punishments.49  The Supreme Court did not address the 
question whether the punitive damages award violated the Due Process 
Clause50 because the issue was not properly preserved.51  However, the 
Court left the door open, noting:
There is some authority in our opinions for the view 
that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the 
size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a 
statutory scheme . . . but we have never addressed the 
precise question presented here: whether due process 
acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award 
49
. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262, 266.  The Court found 
that the Eighth Amendment only applies to government actions, and 
therefore does not limit damage awards in private civil cases.  See 
id. at 260.  However, if the damages award goes to the state, even in 
a private civil case, the result may well be different.  See infra
note 231.
50
. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
51
. See id.  BFI did not raise the due process issue in its 
petition for certiorari and did not assert that the award violated due 
process before either the district court or the court of appeals.  Id.
at 277.  Nor did it claim that the jury was biased or the procedures 
were fundamentally unfair.  Id. at 276.
punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory 
limit. . . . That inquiry must await another day.52
That day came two years later in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., v. Haslip.53  In that case, Cleopatra Haslip sued Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Company and one of its employees, claiming that the 
employee misappropriated her health insurance payments, resulting in 
the termination of her policy, and that the company was liable for 
52
. Id. at 276–77 (citations omitted). See also id. at 280 
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing that Court’s 
decision “leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process 
Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases 
brought by private parties”).  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice 
Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part.  Justice O’Connor 
argued that punitive damage awards should be restricted by the Eighth 
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.  Id. at 297–98 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  She recommended remanding 
the case, so the lower court could conduct a proportionality analysis 
under the following guidelines: (1) “accord ‘substantial deference’ to 
the legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the 
conduct at issue,” (2) “examine the gravity of the defendant’s conduct 
and the harshness of the award,” and (3) “compare the civil and 
criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for different 
types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by 
different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct.”  Id. at 300–
01 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53
. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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damages under the theory of respondeat superior.54  Haslip sought 
$200,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages.55
A jury awarded Haslip a total of $1,040,000, of which $840,000 was 
presumably punitive damages.56  The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the 
award, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
propriety of the punitive damages award.57
The Court began by noting that the common law method for 
assessing punitive damages allows the award to be determined by a jury 
and then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is 
reasonable.  The Court declared that this method was not “so 
inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se 
54
. See id. at 4–7.  Because her health insurance policy was 
cancelled, Haslip was unable to pay for hospital and physician charges 
that she incurred.  This resulted in a collection agency obtaining a 
judgment against her, which adversely affected her credit rating.   
Three other parties also filed suit against the defendants, claiming 
that their policies had been improperly terminated.  Id. at 5.
55
. See id. at 7 n.2.
56
. See id.  The jury also awarded the other plaintiffs 
approximately $38,000.  Id. at 7.  That award was not at issue before 
the Supreme Court.  
57
. See id. at 7–8.  Pacific Mutual lost on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, with two judges dissenting on the ground that the 
excessive damages violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  Id. at 7.
unconstitutional.”58  However, the Court noted that unlimited jury or 
judicial discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages “may 
invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”59
Nevertheless, the Court declined to set forth a bright line 
mathematical test for determining whether awards of punitive damages 
were unconstitutionally excessive.60  Instead, it focused on whether 
the state’s procedures for determining and reviewing punitive damage 
58
. Id. at 17.  The Court noted that it, as well as every other 
state and federal court that had considered the issue, had upheld the 
common-law method by assessing punitive damages.  Id.  The Court 
stated, “If a thing is practiced for two hundred years by the common 
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
affect it.”  Id. at 17 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 
730 (1988)).  The Court observed, however, that it would be 
inappropriate to say that all punitive damage awards are 
constitutional solely because they have been practiced for many years.  
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.  Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but 
disagreed with this reasoning.  He stated: “Since it has been the 
traditional practice of American courts to leave punitive damages . . 
. to the discretion of the jury . . . I would approve the procedure 
challenged here without further inquiry into its ‘fairness’ or 
‘reasonableness.’”  Id. at 24–25.
59
. Id. at 18.
60
. See id.  The Court noted that the four to one ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages “may be close to the line” between 
constitutional and unconstitutional awards.  Id. at 23–24.
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awards satisfied due process.61  The Court concluded that the jury 
instructions on punitive damages placed reasonable constraints on the 
jury’s discretion and that Alabama’s post-trial procedures for 
reviewing punitive damage awards were reasonable.62
61
. See id. at 19.  
62
. See id. at 19.  The Court found that, although the jury had 
significant discretion in determining the amount of the award, the 
instructions confined the award to the well-recognized dual goals of 
punitive damages, deterrence and retribution, therefore satisfying the 
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause.  Id.
Professors Polinsky and Shavell define general deterrence as “the 
effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the 
behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (and not just on 
the party at hand).”  A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 877 (1998).  
Retribution “is the right that the magistrate has to inflict pain on a 
subject in consequence of his having committed a crime.”  Immanuel 
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 99 (1965) (discussing the 
right to punish).  Some commentators argue that a retribution-based 
punitive damage award theory is unsatisfactory in most instances, 
especially when the defendant is a corporation.  See Polinsky & 
Shavell, supra, at 906.  However, federal and state courts generally 
accept these dual goals as valid.  See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (noting 
that “punitive damages are imposed for the purposes of deterrence and 
retribution”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
123 S. Ct. 1513, 1519 (2003) (explaining that punitive damages, unlike 
The Court also addressed the amount of the award, noting that it 
was greater than four times the compensatory damages, more than 200 
times Haslip’s out-of-pocket expenses, and well in excess of the fine 
that could be imposed under state law for insurance fraud.63  The Court 
ruled that, “while the monetary comparisons are wide, . . . [the 
punitive damages did] not cross the line into an area of 
constitutional impropriety.”64
Justice O’Connor dissented.  She argued that in recent years 
there had been an explosion in the frequency and size of awards of 
punitive damages and that the time had come to reassess the 
constitutionality of the practice.65  Due process, she asserted, 
compensatory damages, are aimed at deterrence and retribution); Cooper 
Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) 
(noting that punitive damages “operate as ‘private fines,’ intended to 
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”).
63
. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
64
. Id. at 23–24.  The Court also found Pacific Mutual liable for 
the punitive damage award via respondeat superior under Alabama law 
and rejected Pacific-Mutual’s argument that the Court should raise the 
burden of persuasion above the currently used “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard.  Id. at 18–19, 23.
65
. See id. at 62.  Justice O’Connor further noted:
Punitive damages are . . . ripe for reevaluation.  In 
the past, such awards ‘merited scant attention’ because 
they were ‘rarely assessed and likely to be small in 
24 
“demands that we possess some degree of confidence that the procedures 
employed to deprive persons of life, liberty, and property are capable 
of producing fair and reasonable results.”66  In Justice O’Connor’s 
view, Alabama’s procedures were insufficient to constrain the 
discretion of juries in deciding both whether to award punitive 
damages and the amount of such awards.67
amount.’  When awarded, they were reserved for the most 
reprehensible, outrageous or insulting acts.  Even then, 
they came at a time when compensatory damages were not 
available for pain, humiliation, and other forms of 
intangible injury.  Punitive damages filled this gap.  
Recent years, however, have witnessed an explosion in 
the frequency and size of punitive damage awards.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
66
. Id. at 63.
67
. See id. For a discussion of Haslip, see David F. Cutter, Note, 
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.: A Failure to Create 
True Constitutional Protection Against Excessive Punitive Damages, 44 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 631, 651 (1995) (“Haslip clearly established that 
there were due process limits to punitive damages” and “established a 
framework for determining whether an award satisfied the requirements 
of due process.”);  Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive 
Damages: An Analysis of Constitutional and Other Challenges to 
Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 13 
(1995) (noting that “the Haslip impact has been more of a whisper than 
a bang”); Elizabeth H. Sperow, Note, Constitutional Law: TXO 
Not long thereafter, the Court again considered whether a large 
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp,68  TXO filed suit contesting Alliance’s title to an oil and gas 
interest, and Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title.69  The jury 
Production Corporation v. Alliance Resources Corporation Ruling Leaves 
Defendants Who Assert Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damage Awards 
Still Searching for a Compass, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 335, 355 (1994) 
(interpreting Haslip as “a justification for deferential review rather 
than any meaningful precedent”).  One year after Haslip, few state 
courts changed their laws governing and reviewing punitive damage 
awards.  See Sarah Stevens & Harry Lempert, One Year After Haslip,
State Systems for Awards Mostly Upheld, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
347 (Mar. 13, 1993).
68
. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
69
. See id. at 447.  TXO wanted to obtain the rights to develop 
oil and gas on property controlled by Alliance.  Id.  TXO contracted 
with Alliance to develop these rights, and Alliance agreed to return 
the consideration paid if title failed.  Id. at 477–78.  Following  
the execution of a contract between the parties, TXO’s attorneys 
discovered an earlier deed purporting to transfer the mineral rights 
to a third party.  Id. at 448.  However, further investigation by TXO 
revealed that the earlier deed only involved coal rights, and did not 
affect the title given to it by Alliance.  Id.  Despite these 
findings, TXO purchased a quitclaim deed from the current owner of the 
coal rights and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the original deed’s 
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returned a verdict for Alliance, awarding it $19,000 in compensatory 
and $10 million in punitive damages.70  The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia affirmed.71
A divided Supreme Court upheld the award.  As in Haslip, the 
plurality72 in TXO declined to formulate a mathematical bright line 
between constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable awards of 
punitive damages.73  It noted, however, that “a general concern of 
reasonableness . . . properly enters into the constitutional 
calculus.”74  The plurality determined that, although the punitive 
damages were 526 times the amount of the compensatory damages awarded 
grantee to execute a false affidavit saying that the earlier deed 
included the oil and gas rights.  Id. at 449–50.  TXO then contacted 
Alliance, questioning their title, and tried to renegotiate the 
contract.  Id. at 449.  TXO filed for a declaratory judgment after 
negotiations failed.  Id.
70
. See id. at 446.  The $19,000 compensatory award was based on 
Alliance’s costs of defending TXO’s frivolous lawsuit.  Id. at 451.
71
. See id. at 452.
72
. Justice Stevens wrote for the plurality; he was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.  Justice Kennedy 
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.  Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.  Justice O’Connor, Justice 
White and Justice Souter dissented.
73
. See id. at 458.
74
. Id. (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 2, 
18 (1991)).
to Alliance, the damages did not violate substantive due process.75
The plurality recognized that due process imposed substantive limits 
to damage awards, but that jury-awarded punitive damages deserved a 
strong presumption of validity.76  The plurality concluded that the 
punitive damage award was reasonable based on TXO’s malicious conduct 
and the potential for harm had their plan succeeded.77
75
. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459, 462.
76
. See id. at 454–55, 457.
77
. See id. at 461.  TXO additionally argued that its financial 
resources should not have been included as a factor to determine the 
amount of the punitive damages award.  Id. at 463 n.28.  The plurality 
disagreed, noting that using the defendant’s wealth to determine the 
appropriate amount of a punitive damages award is both historically 
accepted and constitutional under Haslip.  Id.
TXO also argued that the award violated procedural due process 
because the jury was not adequately instructed, the appellate review 
was deficient, and TXO had no notice that the award would be so large 
or that the jury would use TXO’s wealth to determine the award.  Id. 
at 462–63.  The plurality declined to address the first argument 
because it was not properly preserved.  Id. at 463.  It then dismissed 
TXO’s other due process arguments, ruling that the procedures used 
satisfied the standards set forth in Haslip.  Id. at 462–66.
28 
Justice O’Connor again dissented.78  She argued that the Court 
should focus on three objective criteria for determining the 
constitutionality of punitive damages awards: the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, previous similar damage awards 
rendered in the same and other jurisdictions, and legislatively 
designated penalties for similar misconduct.79  Justice O’Connor argued 
that by assessing a punitive damages award using these factors, a 
court can generally determine whether an award is constitutional.80
One year later, the Supreme Court broke with past practice and 
reversed a punitive damages award on the ground that the procedures 
for reviewing that award violated the Due Process Clause.  In Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg,81 Oberg sued Honda after his three-wheeled all-
terrain vehicle flipped, permanently injuring him.82  The jury awarded 
Oberg $919,390.30 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive 
78
. Justice O’Connor’s dissent was joined by Justice White and, in 
certain parts, by Justice Souter.  Id. at 472 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).
79
. See id. at 481.  Justice O’Connor also mentioned these three 
factors in her opinion in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco 
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 297–98 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).
80
. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81
. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
82
. See id. at 418.  His suit alleged that Honda knew or should 
have known that the vehicle’s three-wheeler design was unreasonably 
dangerous.  Id.
damages.83  The Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
the award, based on an Oregon statute that prohibited judicial review 
of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury unless there was 
no evidence to support the verdict.84
The United States Supreme Court began its opinion by recognizing 
that “an award may be so excessive as to violate due process.”85
Nevertheless, it declined to address whether the punitive damages 
award against Honda was unconstitutionally excessive.86  Instead, the 
Court focused on whether Oregon’s procedures for reviewing punitive 
damages awards ensured that they were not imposed by juries in an 
arbitrary manner.87  The Court held that Oregon’s failure to provide 
defendants with a meaningful way to obtain postverdict judicial review 
of the amount of a punitive damages award violated the Due Process 
83
. See id.  Because Oberg was 20% at fault, the compensatory 
damages were reduced to $735,512.31.  Id.
84
. See id. at 418–19 (quoting Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Ore. 
263, 285 [please cite to the regional reporter – 851 P2d] (1992)).  
Oregon allowed judicial review if a punitive damage award was appealed 
based on improper jury instructions, trial error, or if there was no 
evidence to support any punitive damages award.  Oberg, 512 U.S. at 
427.
85
. Id. at 420.
86
. See id.
87
. See id.
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Clause, because there was no protection against arbitrary and 
inaccurate adjudications that deprive a party of liberty or property.88
The Court overturned a jury award of punitive damages on the 
ground that it was grossly excessive and exceeded constitutional 
88
. See id. at 420, 432.  Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist dissented.  Id. at 436–451.
Commentators disagreed on the effect of the Oberg decision.  
Compare Kemp, supra note 64, at 22–23 (noting that “perhaps Oberg will 
be reviewed narrowly and thus have little practical effect”); with 
Mark. A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: Theoretical 
Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 
52 Syracuse L. Rev. 803, 820 (2002) (stating that Oberg “offered no 
parameters for determining the legitimacy of particular punitive 
damages awards”).  Many asserted that, after deciding three cases in 
less than four years, the Supreme Court still had not provided clear 
guidelines for states to determine if a punitive damage award was 
constitutional. See e.g., Son B. Nguyen, Note, BMW of North America v. 
Gore: Elevating Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of 
Substantive Due Process, 57 Md. L. Rev. 251, 260 (1998) (noting that 
“[b}ecause the Oberg Court based its ruling on procedural grounds, the 
question of whether due process imposed a substantive limit on the 
size of punitive damages remained unanswered”); E. Benjamin Alliker, 
Punitive Damage Awards After Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg: Analyzing the 
Triumverate of History, Due Process and the Jury, 6 Md. J. Contemp. 
Legal Issues 377, 397 (1995) (stating that Oberg “increased confusion 
regarding punitive damages reform”).
limits for the first time in BMW of North America Inc., v. Gore.89 In 
that case, Gore alleged that BMW committed fraud under Alabama law by 
failing to disclose that the new car that he purchased from an 
authorized dealer had been damaged and repainted prior to its sale.90
A jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages91 and $4 million in 
punitive damages, finding that BMW’s actions constituted gross, 
oppressive or malicious fraud.92  BMW appealed.93  Although the Alabama 
89
. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
90
. See id. at 563.  The Alabama statute provided: “Suppression of 
a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate 
constitutes fraud.  The obligation to communicate may arise from the 
confidential relations of the parties or from the particular 
circumstances of the case.”  Id. at 563 n.3 (quoting Ala. Code § 6-5-
102 (1993)).  
The damage to Gore’s car only amounted to $601.37, approximately 
1.5% of its list price.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 564.  BMW admitted that it 
did not disclose the second paint job, based on a nationwide policy of 
suppressing details of repairs when the damage was less than 3% of the 
car’s suggested retail price.  Id. at 563–64.  This practice was 
permitted by statute in 25 states, but not in Alabama.  Id. at 565.  
BMW’s non-disclosure policy had never been deemed unlawful before Gore 
filed suit.  Id.
91
. See id. at 564–65.  Gore’s actual damages were based on the 
statements of a former BMW dealer, who testified that the second paint 
job decreased the value of the BMW by 10%.  Id. at 564.
92
. See id. at 565.
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Supreme Court rejected BMW’s claim that the award was 
unconstitutionally excessive,94 it reduced the punitive damages to $2 
million, ruling that the jury improperly calculated the award by 
basing it on BMW’s conduct in other states.95  The United States 
Supreme Court reversed.96
The Court initially noted that a state may impose punitive 
damages to further its “legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.”97  As a result, the Court stated 
that the inquiry to determine whether a punitive damages award is 
unconstitutionally excessive begins with identifying the interests 
that a punitive damages award is designed to serve.98  The Court 
determined that while Alabama had a legitimate interest in awarding 
93
. See id.  BMW asserted that evidence of its lawful conduct in 
other states wrongfully influenced the award and that punitive damages 
would serve no deterrent purpose because it had already repealed the 
non-disclosure policy.  Id. at 565–66.
94
. See id. at 566.  The Alabama Supreme Court analyzed the award 
based on the factors set forth in Haslip.  Id. at 567.  The Alabama 
court noted that BMW acted reprehensibly, profited from its fraudulent 
behavior, was not subject to any criminal sanctions, and that only a 
large award could properly deter a large company like BMW.  Id. at 
567–68.
95
. See id. at 567.
96
. See id. at 585–86.
97
. Id. at 568.
98
. See id.
punitive damages in this case – preventing manufacturers from engaging 
in deceptive trade practices – such damages could only be imposed for 
conduct committed within its jurisdiction.99  To impose economic 
sanctions for conduct outside the state, the Court held, would 
improperly punish BMW for conduct that was possibly lawful in other 
jurisdictions and that would have no effect on Alabama.100  The Court 
thus agreed with the portion of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision 
that the jury had improperly calculated the amount of punitive damages 
because it based its award in large part on BMW’s conduct outside the 
state.101
The Court next turned to whether the reduced award was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court announced three guideposts to 
be used in reviewing punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages, and (3) the difference between the 
99
. See id. at 573.
100
. See id.
101
. See id. at 574–75.  While Alabama was permitted to impose 
punitive damages to protect its own consumers, the basic tenets of 
state sovereignty forbid it to punish a corporation for its lawful 
conduct in other jurisdictions.  Id. at 571.  However, BMW’s out-of-
state conduct could be used to determine the degree of 
reprehensibility of its conduct.  Id. at 573 n.20.
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punitive damages award and the penalties authorized or imposed for 
similar conduct.102
The Court noted that the first guidepost, the degree of 
reprehensibility, was the most important indicium of reasonableness.103
Applying this factor, the Court determined that BMW’s conduct was not 
sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million punitive damages 
award.104  The Court explained that the harm to Gore was purely 
economic, as opposed to physical, and that there was no evidence of 
“deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or 
concealment of evidence of improper motive.”105
Turning to the second guidepost, the Court stated that the 
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual 
harm inflicted on the plaintiff.106  Consistent with Haslip and TXO, 
102
. See id. at 575.  Justice O’Connor had advocated similar 
criteria in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, 
492 U.S. 257, 297–98 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  She also advocated comparing punitive damages 
awards to legislative penalties in TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Res. 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
103
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
104
. See id. at 580.
105
. Id. at 579.  The Court noted that conduct causing economic 
injury could be extremely reprehensible in some cases, especially when 
the defendant is financially vulnerable, but that BMW’s conduct in 
this case was not.  Id. at 579–80.
106
. See id. at 580.
the Court refused to adopt a simple mathematical formula to determine 
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.107  It stated, 
however, that the $2 million punitive damages award against BMW, which 
was 500 times the actual harm to Gore, “surely raise[s] a suspicious 
judicial eyebrow.”108
The Court then addressed the third guidepost, which compares the 
punitive damages award and the sanctions that could be imposed by the 
state for comparable misconduct.109  The Court explained that, in 
107
. See id. at 582.
108
. Id. at 582–83 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  The Court 
distinguished its approval of a 526 to 1 ratio in TXO by noting that 
the potential harm was much greater than the actual harm suffered by 
Alliance in TXO.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 581.  For a further discussion of 
TXO, see supra notes 65–77 and accompanying text.
109
. See id. at 583.  It should be noted that the majority of 
American states allow punitive damages even if the defendant has 
already been subject to criminal proceedings for the same conduct.  
See 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, at § 3:2 (citing cases).  
There are two justifications for this rule.  The first is that the 
prohibition on double jeopardy applies only to multiple criminal 
prosecutions by the same sovereign.  See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. 
Anderson, 596 P.2d 413, 415 (Colo. App. 1979); Olson v. Walker, 781 
P.2d 1015, 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1989).  Civil and criminal 
penalties serve different purposes: criminal sanctions redress a wrong 
to the public, whereas punitive damages in a civil action redress a 
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applying this factor, a reviewing court should “accord ‘substantial 
deference’ to the legislative judgments concerning appropriate 
sanctions for the conduct at issue.”110  In the instant case, the Court 
stated, the maximum civil penalty for deceptive trade practices in 
Alabama was $2,000 – far less than the $2 million punitive damages 
award.111  The Court also noted that “[t]he sanction imposed in this 
case cannot be justified on the ground that it was necessary to deter 
future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies 
could be expected to achieve that goal.”112
Based on its application of the three guideposts, the Court 
concluded that the award was so grossly excessive that it exceeded the 
constitutional limit.113  It thus reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
judgment and remanded the case for that court to decide whether to 
wrong to a private party.  See Wittman v. Gilson, 520 N.E.2d 514, 515 
(N.Y. 1988); Moody v. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1120 (Ala. 1978).  By 
contrast, in some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
punitive damages may not be assessed against a defendant if he or she 
has already been substantially punished in a criminal proceeding.  See
Gray v. Motor Accident Comm’n (1998) 158 A.L.R. 485; Daniels v. 
Thompson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 22.
110
. Id. at 583 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
111
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.
112
. Id.
113
. See id. at 858–86.
grant BMW a new trial or to independently determine a constitutionally 
appropriate award.114
114
. See id. at 586.  Justice Breyer, with whom Justices 
O’Connor and Souter joined, filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 586–
87.  Justice Breyer asserted that Alabama’s procedures for awarding 
and upholding punitive damage awards were vague, providing few 
constraints, and that the Alabama Supreme Court failed to properly 
review the award.  Id. at 588.  He then scrutinized the award under 
the Alabama standards, approved in Haslip.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 589–92.  
Justice Breyer found that BMW did not have adequate notice of the 
award and that the award was constitutionally unsound because 
Alabama’s standards were unequally applied.  Id. at 587.  Justice 
Scalia dissented, rejecting the Court’s finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided substantive restraints on punitive damages awards.  
Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented.  She argued that the award 
should be upheld because the Alabama Supreme Court followed procedures 
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Haslip.  Id. at 607 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In addition, she viewed the majority’s 
decision as “unnecessarily and unwisely ventur[ing] into territory 
traditionally within the State’s domain . . . .”  Id.
Reaction to BMW was mixed.  Some commentators maintained that BMW
established a consistent test for determining whether an award was 
constitutional and ensured fair notice before punitive damage awards 
could be assessed.  See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 85, at 269 (noting 
that “BMW Court developed a coherent framework for determining whether 
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a punitive damages award is within the constitutionally accepted 
range”).  Others argued that the three guide posts analyzed in BMW, 
reprehensibility, ratio and criminal sanctions, are “far too 
subjective and malleable to be meaningful beyond the facts of BMW v. 
Gore.”  Neil B. Stekloff, Note and Comment, Raising Five Eyebrows: 
Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. 
Gore, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1797, 1817 (1997).  Another commentator averred 
that the Court left lower courts with no guidance to decide whether an 
award was constitutional.  See Donnie E. Martin, BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore: An Explanation of Standards or a Mere Examination of the 
Constitutional Boundaries of Punitive Damage Awards, 35 Ct. Rev. 26, 
30 (1998) (noting that “the Court has left lower Courts without any 
guidance with which to deal with future procedural challenges”).  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, lower courts immediately began 
applying BMW, reducing some damage awards and upholding others.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding award because defendant had fair notice and ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages was 1.78 to 1); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 
213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that ratio of 26.3 to 1 
satisfied due process); Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(upholding $500,000 award because defendant’s conduct was 
reprehensible, 2-1 ratio was not unreasonable, and award was less than 
comparable criminal penalties); Watson v. Johnson Mobile Homes, 284 
F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing award because Mississippi criminal 
statutes imposed smaller penalty than 175 times actual damage).
Four years after BMW, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
another punitive damage case, Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool 
Group, Inc.115  There, Leatherman alleged that Cooper had engaged in 
trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising.116
A jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 
million in punitive damages.117  The district court upheld the award 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling inter alia that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 
punitive damages award was constitutional under the BMW test.118  The 
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court initially noted that punitive damages are “‘quasi-
criminal,’ [and] operate as ‘private fines’ intended to punish the 
defendant and to deter wrongdoing.”119  It then drew a distinction 
between a jury’s assessment of compensatory and punitive damages: the 
former is a factual determination while the latter is an expression of 
moral condemnation.  Because of the nature of punitive damages, the 
115
. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
116
. See id. at 427–28.
117
. See id. at 429.  With respect to the punitive damages 
claim, the jury determined that “Leatherman [had] shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that by engaging in false advertising or passing 
off, Cooper acted with malice, or showed a reckless and outrageous 
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and . . . acted 
with a conscious indifference to Leatherman’s rights.”  Id.
118
. See id. at 429–31.
119
. Id. at 432.
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Court held that the Constitution imposes limits on their imposition, 
and that the general criteria to determine whether an award violates 
the Due Process Clause are set forth in BMW.120  Whether these 
criterion have been met, the Court ruled, must be determined de novo
on appeal.121  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the 
less demanding abuse of discretion standard when it reviewed the 
district court’s determination that the award was constitutional.122
120
. See id. at 432–35.
121
. See id. at 436.
122
. See id. at 432–43.  In addition, the Court also stated that 
the jury’s award of punitive damages was not a “finding of fact” and, 
as a result, a de novo review of that award “does not implicate 
Seventh Amendment concerns.”  Id. at 437.
The Court also independently reviewed the district court’s 
decision and, after applying the BMW factors, speculated that the 
trial court’s decision might not survive de novo review upon remand.  
Id. at 441–43.  Applying the first factor, the degree of the 
defendant’s misconduct, the Court noted that Cooper’s conduct that 
resulted in the award of punitive damages may in fact have been 
entirely lawful and hence not reprehensible.  The Court next opined 
that the district court may have improperly applied the second BMW
factor, the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.  With 
respect to the third factor, the Court noted:
[R]espondent argues that Cooper would have been subject 
to a comparable sanction under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade 
Practices Act.  In a suit brought by a State under that 
The Supreme Court clarified the BMW guideposts last term in State 
Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.123  The case arose after 
Curtis Campbell caused a car accident, killing Todd Ospital and 
permanently disabling Robert Slusher.124  Ospital’s estate and Slusher 
Act, a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per violation may 
be assessed.  In respondent’s view, each of the 
thousands of pieces of promotional material containing a 
picture of PST that Cooper [wrongfully] distributed 
warranted the maximum fine.  Petitioner, on the other 
hand, argues that its preparation of a single “mock-up” 
for use in a single distribution would have been viewed 
as a single violation under the state statute.  The 
Court of Appeals . . . observe[d] that the unfairness in 
Cooper’s use of the picture apparently had nothing to do 
with misleading customers but was related to its 
inability to obtain a “mock-up” quickly and cheaply.  
This observation is more consistent with the single-
violation theory than with the statutory violation would 
have been sanctioned with a multimillion dollar fine.
Id. at 443.  While Cooper addressed an important appellate procedural 
question, it did little to further the due process issues faced by 
trial courts.  See Klugheit, supra note 85, at 837.
123
. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
124
. See id.  Campbell, while riving with his wife, Inez Preece 
Campbell, tried to pass six vans on a two-lane highway.  Id. Todd 
Ospital was traveling in the other lane. Ospital swerved to avoid 
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offered to settle for $50,000, Campbell’s policy limit.125  Although 
State Farm knew the accident was Campbell’s fault, it refused to 
settle, and the case proceeded to trial.126  The jury found Campbell 
entirely at fault and returned a verdict of $185,849.127  State Farm 
thereafter refused to pay the difference between the proposed 
settlement amount and the jury verdict or to post a supersedeas bond 
so that Campbell could appeal the award.128  Campbell then retained his 
own counsel and appealed the verdict.129  After the appeal was denied, 
State Farm paid the entire judgment.130
colliding with Campbell and, as a result, he lost control of his 
vehicle and struck a car driven by Robert G. Slusher.  Id.  While the 
Campbells escaped uninjured, Ospital was killed and Slusher was 
permanently disabled.  Id.
125
. See id. at 1518.
126
. See id.  Originally, Campbell claimed that he was not at 
fault.  Id. at 1517.  However, after interviewing witnesses, State 
Farm investigators found otherwise and assured the Campbells that 
State Farm would represent their best interests.  Id.
127
. See id.
128
. See id.  Representatives for State Farm even told the 
Campbells to “put for sale signs on your property to get things 
moving.”  Id.
129
. See id.  While the appeal was pending, Campbell entered 
into an agreement with Ospital’s estate and Slusher.  Id.  They would 
not seek satisfaction of their claims against Campbell in exchange for 
The Campbells then filed suit against State Farm, alleging bad 
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.131
During both portions of the bifurcated trial,132 State Farm attempted 
unsuccessfully to suppress evidence relating to its conduct outside of 
Utah.133  A jury awarded the Campbells $2.5 million in compensatory 
damages and $145 million in punitive damages.134  The trial court then 
reduced the award to $1 million in compensatory damages and $25 
90% of any verdict Campbell obtained in a bad faith action against 
State Farm.  Id.
130
. See id.
131
. See id.  State Farm’s motion for summary judgment was 
initially granted because they paid the verdict, but was reversed on 
appeal.  Id.
132
. See id.  In the first phase of the trial, the jury found 
that State Farm acted unreasonably by not settling.  Id.  In the 
second phase, the jury addressed State Farm’s liability for fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and determined the damage 
amount.  Id.
133
. See id. at 1518–19.  The contested evidence included 
unrelated cases outside of Utah and State Farm’s Performance, Planning 
and Review (PPR) system.  Id. at 1519.  The PPR had been used 
nationwide by State Farm for 20 years.  Id.  Most of the PPR was 
unrelated to automobile insurance claims like the Campbells’, but did 
focus on capping payouts to meet corporate fiscal goals.  Id. at 1518–
19.
134
. See id. at 1519.
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million in punitive damages.135  Both parties appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court.136  After purporting to apply the guidelines set forth 
in BMW, that court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages 
award.137  The United States Supreme Court reversed.138
The Court began its analysis by stating that grossly excessive 
punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause because they further 
no legitimate state purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of 
property.139  The Court noted that civil awards of punitive damages 
should be of particular concern, because, while they serve a similar 
purpose as criminal fines, the parties subject to awards of punitive 
damages are not accorded the same protections that defendants enjoy in 
135
. See id.  One commentator notes that “the jury, faced with 
reams of evidence of ‘bad acts’ on the part of State Farm, simply came 
up with a number that would ‘send a message’ or make State Farm ‘stand 
accountable for what it’s doing across the country.’” Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Compensatory Damages, 113 Yale 
L. J. *1, *112 (forthcoming 2003).
136
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
137
. See id.  The court found that State Farm’s conduct was 
reprehensible, would only be punished once per every 50,000 incidents, 
and was comparable to the various civil and criminal penalties State 
Farm could face.  Id.
138
. See id. at 1526.  Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas 
dissented.
139
. See id. at 1520.
criminal proceedings.140  The Court further noted that because juries 
often have wide discretion in setting the amount of the punitive 
damages award, there is a potential for juries to use their verdicts 
to express their bias against the defendants, who are often 
nonresidents without strong local ties.141
The Court subsequently turned to BMW’s three guideposts for 
reviewing punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility 
of the misconduct, (2) the ratio between actual or potential harm and 
the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the 
sanctions for comparable conduct and the punitive damages award.142  It 
then elaborated on the first guidepost.  The Court stated that the 
defendant’s reprehensibility, the most important guidepost, can be 
determined by looking to the following factors: (i) whether the harm 
caused was physical or economic, (ii) whether the defendant’s conduct 
evinced an indifference to the safety or health of others, (iii) 
whether the plaintiff was experiencing financial difficulty or was 
otherwise vulnerable, (iv) whether the conduct at issue was an 
isolated incident or was repeatedly performed by the defendant, and 
(v) whether the defendant’s conduct exhibited malice, trickery or 
deceit.143  While the Court found State Farm’s conduct blameworthy 
enough to impose some punitive damages, it stated that a smaller award 
140
. See id.
141
. See id.
142
. See id. at 1521.
143
. See id.
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would serve Utah’s dual goals of deterrence and retribution.144  Here, 
Utah was punishing State Farm not only for its actions in the state, 
but also for its nationwide practices, which the Court specifically 
ruled improper in BMW.145  The jury award was also incorrectly based on 
evidence of other conduct by State Farm that was objectionable, yet 
dissimilar.146 Therefore, because the Campbells did not present 
evidence of similar conduct, State Farm’s reprehensibility could be 
properly based only on its interaction with the Campbells.147
The Court next turned to the second guidepost and stated that 
courts must ensure that the punitive damages award is both reasonable 
and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and the 
compensatory damages recovered.148  As in its previous cases, the Court 
144
. See id. at 1522.
145
. See id. at 1521 (“This case . . . was used as a platform to 
expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s 
operations throughout the country.”).
146
. See id. at 1523 (“A defendant’s dissimilar acts, 
independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not 
serve as the basis for punitive damages.”).  The Court noted that 
recidivist defendants may be more reprehensible than first-time 
offenders, but that punitive damage awards should be limited to only 
the conduct charged.  Id.  The Court also found that the award was 
erroneously based on twenty years of conduct by State Farm.  Id. at 
1524.
147
. See id.
148
. See id. at 1524.
declined to adopt a bright-line ratio that a punitive damages award 
cannot exceed.149  However, this time, the Court came close to such a 
rule: “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between compensatory 
and punitive damages, to a significant degree, will likely satisfy due 
process . . . .”150  The Court further noted that a higher ratio may be 
constitutional if an especially malevolent act caused only a small 
amount of harm, and that a lower ratio would be constitutional if the 
compensatory damages were considerable.151  The Court suggested that if 
149
. See id. Before State Farm, the Court had refuse to draw any 
line between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damage 
awards, instead relying on general considerations of “reasonableness.”  
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“We have 
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is 
marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual 
and potential damages to the punitive award.”); see also Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We need not, and 
indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the 
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that 
would fit every case.”).
149
. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. (citations omitted).
151
. See id.  This sliding scale was originally suggested in 
BMW:
[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly 
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards if, 
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted 
in only a small amount of economic damages.  A higher 
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compensatory damages are substantial, then the Constitution may limit 
recovery to a doubling of those damages.152  Applying the guidepost, 
the Court opined that there was a presumption that the $145 million 
punitive damages award was invalid because of the 145 to 1 ratio, the 
$1 million compensatory damages award for a year and a half of 
emotional distress was substantial, and the Campbells had suffered 
only minor economic injuries.153  The Court also dismissed as improper 
the Utah Supreme Court’s assertion that State Farm’s substantial 
assets provided a basis for upholding the excessive award.154  The 
Court stated that an unconstitutional award is not justified because 
the defendant is wealthy.155
ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury 
is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic 
harm might have been difficult to determine.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
152
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“When compensatory 
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to 
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process 
guarantee.”).
153
. See id. at 1524–25.  In fact, the Court noted that the 
compensatory award for emotional distress already contained a punitive 
element.  Id. at 1525 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, 
cmt. c, at 466 (1977)).
154
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
155
. See id. at 1525.  But see Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21–22 
(adopting “financial position of the defendant” as factor to determine 
With respect to the third guidepost, the Court noted that in the 
past it had looked to criminal penalties that could be imposed because 
they illustrate the seriousness with which the state views the 
misconduct.156  The Court cautioned that this guidepost should not be 
taken to mean that punitive damages could be used as a substitute for 
criminal punishment, which may be imposed only after proceedings where 
the defendant is accorded more protections and where there exists a 
higher standard of proof.157  The Court noted that the comparable 
whether punitive damage award is reasonable); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 463 n.28 (1993) (plurality opinion) 
(admitting evidence of defendant’s wealth based on “well settled 
law”).
156
. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
157
. The Court stated:
When used to determine the dollar amount of the award, . 
. . the criminal penalty has less utility.  Great care 
must be taken to avoid the use of the civil process to 
assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after 
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been 
observed, including, of course, its higher standard of 
proof.  Punitive damages are not a substitute for the 
criminal process, and the remote possibility of a 
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a 
punitive damages award.
Id.
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penalty under Utah law for State Farm’s conduct was a $10,000 fine for 
fraud.158  That amount, the Court stated, was dwarfed by the punitive 
damages award of $145 million.159
As in BMW, applying the guideposts led the Court to conclude that 
the $145 million punitive damages award “was neither reasonable nor 
proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and 
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”160
158
. See id.
159
. See id.  Previously, the Supreme Court of Utah declared 
that the award was comparable to similar statutory sanctions because 
State Farm could have lost their business license or been subject to 
imprisonment.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court dismissed these 
findings as merely speculation, asserting that they were erroneously 
based on out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.  Id.
160
. Id.  Justice Scalia dissented, once again asserting his 
belief that the Constitution imposed no substantive due process limits 
on punitive damages.  Id. at 1526 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Thomas agreed, noting, “I continue to believe that the Constitution 
does not constrain the size of punitive damage awards.”  Id. (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Thomas, J., dissenting))).  Justice Ginsburg also dissented.  She 
stressed that, although damage caps may be proper, they should be 
implemented solely through state action.  See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 
at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg additionally 
These decisions show that, in a relatively short amount of time, 
the Court has evolved from a hands-off policy of reviewing punitive 
damages awards to establishing both procedural and substantive due 
process requirements for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive 
damages awards.  The later is particularly significant.  Decisions, 
such as BMW and State Farm, unambiguously illustrate that the Court is 
deeply concerned with grossly excessive awards of punitive damages and 
that it will not hesitate to find that such damages arbitrarily 
deprive a defendant of property in violation of the Due Process Clause 
when they are neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong 
committed.  Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts appear to 
be scrutinizing punitive damages awards more closely.161
IV.  Interpreting the Third Guidepost: Unclear Directions, Wrong Turns 
and Confusion on the Road
asserted that State Farm’s out-of-state conduct was sufficiently 
similar to its interaction with the Campbells to be introduced at 
trial to demonstrate reprehensibility.  Id. at 1527–31.
161
. See Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of 
Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 40 (examining studies of 
punitive damages awards and appellate review of such awards).
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Despite the Supreme Court’s concern about grossly excessive 
punitive damages awards and its desire to illuminate a path for lower 
courts to follow, the Court’s guideposts have not produced a workable  
and predictable test for determining the constitutionality of large 
punitive awards.162 The problems with the Court’s approach stem from 
its interpretation of the first two guideposts and its failure to 
articulate what role the third guidepost should play in determining 
whether a punitive damages award violates substantive due process.
To date, much of the focus of courts has been on the first two 
guideposts.163  Similarly, commentators have centered their attention 
162
. This is not the fault of the lower courts, instead, the 
problems stem from the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a strong 
test for analyzing punitive damages awards.  See BMW, 517 U.S. at 605 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In truth, the ‘guideposts’ mark a road to 
nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”).
163
. For court decisions focusing on the first guidepost, see 
e.g., Willow Inn, Inc. v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9558 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award 
because target was financially vulnerable and insurer repeatedly 
failed to pay plaintiff’s claim); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School-Freistadt v. Tower Ins. Co., 611 N.W.2d 789,  [needed for 
quote] (Wis. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award, stating 
“repeated disregard for the law and its duty indeed seems egregious 
and reprehensible”); In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 291 B.R. 
727,  [needed for quote] (E.D. Mich. 2003) (upholding punitive 
damages award because “evidence of Adell’s bad faith is 
on these two guideposts.164  Because much has been written on the first 
two guideposts, we only survey them and offer a close examination of 
the third.165
overwhelming”); Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country Club, Inc., 791 
N.E.2d 903, 916 (Mass. App. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award 
because defendant was “cavalier and callously indifferent”).
For court decisions focusing on the second guidepost, see, e.g., 
Shales v. General Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers and Helpers Local Union No. 
330, 2203 WL  22038643 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2003) (upholding punitive 
damages award where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
was less than 2 to 1without discussion of other guideposts); Hudson v. 
Cook, 105 S.W.3d 821,  [needed for quote] (2003) (upholding award of 
punitive damages primarily because “7:1 ratio in this case is well 
within the acceptable range”); Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 WL 
602796 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997) (upholding punitive damages award 
where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 10 to 1 
without discussion of other guideposts).
164
. For a critical discussion of the first two guideposts, see 
Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s 
Guide to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damages 
Awards, 60 Mont. L. Rev. 367 (1999); Andrea A. Crurcio, Breaking the 
Silence: Using A Notification Penalty and Other Notification Measures 
in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 343 364–65; Jim Davis, 
Note, BMW v. Gore: Why States (Not the U.S. Supreme Court) Should 
Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive Damages 
Awards, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 395, 410–13 (1998); John Zenneth Lagrow, 
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BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Due Process Protection Against 
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 157, 195–98 
(1997); Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1817–23; Recent Development, BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Sticker Shock in America–From Showroom 
to Courtroom, 23 J. Contemp. L. 236, 248 (1997); Glen R. Whitehead, 
BMW of North America v. Gore: Is the Supreme Court Initiating Judicial 
Tort Reform?, 16 Q.L.R. 533, 570–79 (1997); John M. Bodenhausen, Note, 
BMW of North America v. Gore: Tort Reform Won the Battle But Did They 
Lose the War?, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 691, 710–18 (1997); Donald C. 
Massey and Martin A. Stern, Puntive Damages and the Louisiana 
Constitution: Don’t Leave Home Without It, 56 La. L. Rev. 743, 750 
(1996); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of 
Alabama, 56 La. L. Rev. 825 (1996).
165
. It should also be noted that there has been much study of 
the process used to determine punitive damages and whether it results 
in unpredictable awards.  See David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A 
Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 
121, 163–64 (2002) (stating that the design of the punitive damages 
decision makes the system prone to erratic awards); Jonathan M Karpoff 
and John R,. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive 
Damages Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 527, 571 (1999) (concluding that 
punitive damages awards are highly viable and unpredictable), Cass R. 
Sunstein, Daniel Kaheman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 
107 Yale L.J. 2071,  (1998) (same); A. Mitchell Polinshy, Are 
Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational?, 26 
J. Legal. Stud. page, (1997) (same); but see Theodore Eisenberg et 
Although the Court has said that the first guidepost, the degree 
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, is the “most 
important,” it has proved to be amorphous in application.166  By 
nature, determining whether a defendant’s conduct justifies a certain 
amount of punitive damages is a highly subjective assessment that is 
incapable of careful measurement and will vary based on the 
circumstances of a particular case.167  Thus, applying this guidepost 
al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Leg. Stud. 663, 
(1997) (concluding punitive damages are as predictable as compensatory 
damages).  See also George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The 
Case of Alabama, 56 La. L. Rev. 825, 826–30 (1996).  The fact that 
punitive damages awards remain highly unpredictability even after BMW
supports the need for clear guidelines for review on appeal.
166
. See, e.g., Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 
1320, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding $4.35 million punitive damages 
award despite noting that defendant’s conduct “was not particularly 
reprehensible”).  See also Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1818–19 
(concluding that “only guideline as to the ‘degree of 
reprehensibility’ becomes essentially ‘how offended are the reviewing 
justices?’”); Lagrow, supra note 160, at 196–97 (noting that it is 
unclear “how courts should determine the proper amount of punitive 
damages to assess when the defendant’s conduct falls between the 
ranges of violence and pure economic harm”).
167
. See Priest, supra note 160, at 838 (“Reprehensibility is a 
very vague concept and hardly susceptible of careful measurement.”); 
Whitehead, supra note 160, at 571 (stating that reprehensibility “is a 
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may ultimately undermine the purpose of a jury because it may result 
in the jury’s notion of the degree of reprehensibility being 
substituted for that of the appellate court.168  These problems have 
led Justices Scalia and Ginsburg to remark that the guidepost is 
“insusceptible of principled application”169 and courts simply are “not 
well equipped” to perform the requisite analysis.170
Reliance on the first guidepost has resulted in inconsistent 
punitive damages awards.  For example, in Johansen v. Combustion 
point over which reasonable people in the relevant community may 
differ”); Stephanie L. Nagel, BMW v. Gore: The United States Supreme 
Court Overturns an Award of Punitive Damages as Violative of the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution, 71 Tul L. Rev. 1025, 1039 (1997) 
(stating that “the only predictable cases are those that land at the 
extremes of the reprehensibility scale”).
168
. See D’Ambrosia, supra note 9, at 604 (“An examination of 
case law illustrates that a trial or appellate court applying this 
guidepost will substitute a jury’s finding with that of a judge.”); 
Stekloff, supra note 160, at 1818–19 (stating that degree of 
reprehensibility turns “on such factors as ‘bad faith,’ ‘intent,’ 
‘malice’ and ‘fairness’—all classic questions of fact that are 
properly resolved by a jury”).
169
. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 
1513, 1526 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting); see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 604–05 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
170
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 612–13 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting).
Engineering, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit upheld a $4.35 million 
punitive damages award even though that award was almost 100 times the 
compensatory damages of $47,000, and both the court of appeals and the 
district court determined that the defendant’s conduct “was not highly 
reprehensible.”171  By contrast, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. 
Hamilton, the Tenth Circuit, in a case where the compensatory damages 
amounted to $44,000, reduced an award of punitive damages from $1.2 
million to $264,000.172  Furthermore, in a post-State Farm decision, a 
United States district court upheld a $60 million punitive damages 
award even though the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory 
171
. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1337.
172
. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 
861 (10th Cir. 1997).  See also Schimizzi v. Illinois Farmers Ins. 
Co., 928 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (reducing punitive damages to 
approximately 3 times the compensatory damages of $45,000); Kimzey v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997) (reducing punitive 
damages award with ratio to compensatory damages of 140 to 1 to 10 
times the compensatory damages of $35,000).  But see Baribeau v. 
Gustafson, No. 04-01-00732-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2106, at *23–*24 
(Tex. App. Mar. 12, 2003) (upholding $200,000 punitive damage award 
even though there was only $500 in compensatory damages because 
reducing amount of punitive damages would not punish or deter 
egregious conduct).; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, vol. 
reporter page, (upholding $2.1 billion punitive damages award 
because of  reprehensibility of the defendants conduct and because 
amount was “sufficient to achieve the desired deterrent effects”).
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damages was 153 to 1 because it held that a breach of the public trust 
was particularly reprehensible.173  By contrast, the Court of Appeals 
of Texas ruled, in a case compensatory damages totaled $600,000, that 
an award of $1.5 million in punitive damages was appropriate for a 
breach of the public trust.174
173
. See Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 2003 WL 
22111144 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2003).  See also Southeastern Sec. Ins. Co. 
v. Holte, 473 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding punitive 
damages award in sexual harassment case where the ratio between 
punitive damages and compensatory damages was 45,000 to 1 because 
court determined that the conduct was reprehensible).
174
. See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 975 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1998).  See also Lambert v. Fulton County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 
[needed for quote](N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding punitive damages award 
against public officers who engaged in “deceitful conduct where “ratio 
of actual damages to the actual punitive damages awarded for each 
Plaintiff against each Defendant [was] 4.5:1”); Leather v. Ten Eyck, 
97 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding $200,000 compensatory 
damages but vacating as excessive $435,000 in punitive damages against 
sheriff for selective enforcement of drunk driving laws and in 
retaliation for right to free speech).  For a discussion of 
inconsistent punitive damages awards based on the application of the 
first guidepost, see Mark A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the 
Road:” Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive 
Damages Litigation, 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 803, 826–33 (2002).
Because weighing the gravity of the defendant’s conduct in 
relation to the amount of punitive damages is much too discretionary 
to provide a meaningful and consistent constitutional test, some 
courts have relied more heavily on the second guidepost, the ratio 
between actual or potential harm and punitive damages awards.175
However, here too there are serious shortcomings, as was  pointed by 
George Priest:
[T]he mathematical relationship between the compensatory 
and punitive damages element is an odd judicial 
principle.  Is there a principled reason that a ratio of 
1 to 5 or 1 to 4 is constitutionally suspect in 
comparison to a ratio of 1 to 2 or less?  Moreover, if 
the purpose of punitive damages is to deter behavior 
that is morally reprehensible, the relevance of the 
compensatory loss is not immediately evident unless an 
175
. See, e.g., Shales v. General Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers and 
Helpers Local Union No. 330, 2203 WL 22038643 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 
2003) (upholding punitive damages award where ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages was less than 2 to 1 without 
discussion of other guideposts); Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 WL 
602796 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997) (upholding punitive damages award 
where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 10 to 1 
without discussion of other guideposts); see also Hudson v. Cook, 105 
S.W.3d 821,  [needed for quote] (2003) (upholding award of punitive 
damages primarily because “7:1 ratio in this case is well within the 
acceptable range”).
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intent to affect the magnitude of loss was a specific 
element of the reprehensible action.  Many totally 
inadvertent or accidental actions generate huge loss; 
many repugnant and reprehensible actions generate little 
harm, measured solely in compensatory lost income, 
needed expense, and pain and suffering.176
Indeed, one post-BMW study found that federal courts generally 
drew the constitutional line at a 5 to 1 ratio, while state courts 
tended to uphold awards with ratios as high as 30 to 1.177
176
. Priest, supra note 160, at 838.  In fact, a U.S. district 
court in Arizona, in a post-State Farm decision, refused to apply the 
second guidepost, stating that the “application of the numerical ratio 
is most often unfit for the imprecise and limitless characterizations 
of the public trust.” Southern  Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 2003 
WL 22111144,  [needed for quote] (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2003).  See also
Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“[A] 
mechanical ratio, such as two to one or three to one or four to one or 
even ten to one, would not make good sense.”).
177
. See Davis, supra note 160, at 412; Samuel A. Thumma, 
Damages, Nat’l L.J., June 30, 1997, at B5.  See also Klugheit, supra
note __, at 834 (surveying cases and concluding with respect to 
application of second guidepost “that there is not so much enduring 
analytic principles as factors applied idiosyncratically to justify 
either a jury award or a remittitur level that the court feels is 
right for a particular case”). 
A further problem with this guidepost is that it can be too 
easily manipulated through reliance on the imprecise notion of 
potential harm.178  For example, the ratio in TXO has been described as 
being both 526 to 1 (when considering the punitive damages award to 
the actual compensatory damages) and as not more than 10 to 1 (when 
considering the punitive damages award to the potential compensatory 
damages if the tortious plan had succeeded).179  Thus, the reliability 
and usefulness of the second guidepost is questionable.180
178
. See Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory 
Verdicts and the Hard Look, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 995 1018 n.85 (2001) 
(noting that courts have had difficulty in applying second guidepost).
See also BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 581, 581 n.34 (discussing potential harm); 
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch.-Friestadt v. Tower Ins. 
Co., 661 N.W.2d 789, 810–11 (Wis. 2003) (Sykes, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority for adopting potential harm as measure used in 
ratio calculation).  Some commentators argue that  “The imposition of 
damages equal to harm appropriately multiplied to reflect the 
probability of escaping liability, achieves proper deterrence.”  A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,  Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 896, 906 (1998).  But see Keith N. Hylton, 
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 
421, 422–23 (1998) (stating that “the limit suggested by Polinsky and 
Shavell is inappropriate in most punitive damages cases” because it 
focuses on optimal deterrence instead of complete deterrence).
179
. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459–62; see also TVT Records v. Island 
Def Jam Music Group, 2003 WL 22056308 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2003) (noting 
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Each of the BMW guideposts was intended to provide courts with 
clear criteria for evaluating whether a punitive damages award 
violates substantive due process.  Unfortunately, the Court’s 
decisions appear to have obfuscated the third guidepost, the 
comparison between the sanctions that could be imposed for the same 
conduct and the punitive damages award.  Because of the Court’s lack 
of clarity with regard to the purpose of the third guidepost in the 
substantive due process analysis and how it is to be applied, courts 
sometimes ignore this guidepost and, when addressed, often differ over 
its application.
The confused state over the third guidepost results in part from 
the failure of the Court in BMW and State Farm effectively to 
integrate and implement reasons for the guidepost.  The Court has 
articulated three reasons for the third guidepost.181  First, 
comparable legislative sanctions should give a defendant “fair notice” 
of potential punitive damages awards.182  Second, awards in comparable 
cases indicate that a particular practice might result in a large 
that, in applying second guidepost, plaintiffs and defendants used 
different methods for determining the applicable ratio).
180
. See also supra note 160 (listing articles analyzing second 
guidepost).
181
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584. 
182
. See id. (“None of these statutes would provide an out-of-
state distributor with fair notice that the first violation—or indeed, 
the first 14 violations – of its provisions might subject an offender 
to a multimillion dollar penalty.” ).
award.183  Third, comparable sanctions are persuasive evidence of the 
legislature’s concern with deterring similar conduct.184   However, 
without a clear and coherent vision from the Supreme Court, the lower 
courts have not fashioned a meaningful way to apply the third 
guidepost.  As illustrated below, a number of lower courts have simply 
stated that an award of punitive damages does not run afoul of the 
third guidepost if there exists a state law that gives the defendant 
notice that the conduct at issue may give rise to some form of 
criminal or civil liability.185
Furthermore, the State Farm opinion itself appears to undercut 
the perceived value of the third guidepost in the substantive due 
process analysis.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that 
the “existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the 
seriousness with which the state views the wrongful action,” but that 
comparing the punitive damages award to “criminal penalties has less 
utility” in determining whether the amount of punitive damages is so 
excessive that it violates the Constitution.186
Thus, the Court has also obfuscated how the third guidepost is to 
be applied.  Instead of articulating a straightforward approach for 
183
. See id. (stating that “there does not appear to have been 
any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere indicating that 
application of that policy might give rise to such severe 
punishment”).
184
. See id.
185
. See infra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
186
. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
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applying the third guidepost,187 the State Farm decision confuses how 
the criminal sanctions for comparable conduct can be used in 
evaluating whether a punitive damages award comports with substantive 
due process.  In elaborating on the third guidepost, Justice Kennedy 
wrote:
Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil 
process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed 
only after the heightened protections of a criminal 
trial have been observed, including, of course, its 
higher standards of proof.  Punitive damages are not a 
substitute for the criminal process, and the remote 
possibility of a criminal sanction does not 
automatically sustain a punitive damages award.188
This cryptic passage is amenable to multiple interpretations.  
Perhaps Justice Kennedy was trying to explain that judges and juries 
should not view punitive damages as a substitute for criminal 
punishment.  However, this passage also could be interpreted to mean 
that the amount a defendant may be liable for in a criminal proceeding 
for comparable conduct should not be compared with the award of 
punitive damages to determine whether the latter is excessive, because 
the civil suit lacks the protections afforded in criminal 
187
. One commentator states that the third guidepost is 
“sufficiently malleable that the Court essentially is left to its 
discretion.”  See Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1822.
188
. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
prosecutions.  Indeed, one commentator has already asserted that this 
is precisely what Justice Kennedy meant.189  If that is true, the third 
guidepost is essentially meaningless as far as substantive due process 
is concerned. 
Not surprisingly, both state and federal courts have grappled 
with applying the third guidepost with little uniform success.  While 
some courts have attempted to include an analysis of the third 
guidepost in their decisions, other courts have disregarded the third 
guidepost altogether.190  For example, in Borne v. Haverhill Golf & 
189
. See Andreason, supra note 14, at 2692 (stating that “the 
Campbell court drastically curtailed consideration of potential 
criminal penalties on the ground that cases in which punitive damages 
can be awarded lack the protections that attach to criminal 
prosecutions”); see also Commentary, David E. Hogg, Alabama Adopts De 
Novo Review for Punitive Damages Appeals: Another Landmark Decision or 
Much Ado About Nothing?, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 223, 232 n.77 (2002) (stating 
that the third guidepost “is the least-used and most difficult to 
apply of the guideposts” and “quite often [is] dismissed out of 
hand”).
190
. See Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2003 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 872 (2003) (ignoring comparable sanctions after finding 
ratio violated due process); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F.  
Supp. 2d 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (ignoring sanctions); Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 183 (Ala. 2000) (noting that “[w]e 
have no basis for considering this factor relevant”).
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Country Club, Inc.,191 the Massachusetts Appeals Court reviewed a $1.4 
million punitive damages award under the first and second BMW 
guideposts, completely ignoring the third guidepost.192  Similar to 
Justice Kennedy’s statement in State Farm, one court recently 
commented that “the comparable sanctions factor is the least important 
indicium.”193
As noted, a number of courts have ruled that the inquiry under 
the third guidepost is limited to determining whether the defendant 
had reasonable notice that his or her conduct may result in criminal 
or civil liability.194  In Zimmerman v. Direct Federal Credit Union, 
191
. 791 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. App. 2003).
192
. See id. at *28–31.  The court mentioned all three BMW 
guideposts, directly quoting from State Farm, but only analyzed the 
defendant’s reprehensibility and the ratio between the punitive 
damages award and the compensatory award.  Id.
193
. See Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., 
49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002). 
194
. See Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 
F.3d 446, 468 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that “fundamental question” when 
reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness is whether defendant had 
“reasonable notice that its [conduct] could result in such a large 
punitive award” (quoting Continental Trend Resources v. Oxy USA, 101 
F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996));  Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit 
Union, 262 F.3d 70, 83 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that third guidepost 
should be used “to determine whether a particular defendant was given 
fair notice”); see also Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996) 
the First Circuit stated that “a reviewing court should search for 
comparisons solely to determine whether a particular defendant was 
given fair notice as to its potential liability for particular 
misconduct, not to determine an acceptable range into which an award 
might fall.”195  Applying this test, courts have upheld or reduced 
awards based on whether the legislative penalties provided the 
defendant with fair notice of the punitive damages award.196  Although 
(stating that “[w]hen penalties for comparable misconduct are much 
slighter than a punitive damages award, it may be said that the 
tortfeasor lacked ‘fair notice’ that the wrongful conduct could entail 
a substantial punitive award”).
195
. See Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83.  The court in Zimmerman
eventually upheld the award, finding that “the appellants had 
sufficient notice.”  Id.
196
. See Waits v. City of Chicago, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (reducing $2 million punitive damages award to 
$45,000).  The district court further notes, “There is simply no way 
defendants could have fathomed that their conduct would subject them 
to two-million dollars in penalties. . . . Because defendants did not 
have fair notice of the severity of the jury’s punitive damage 
verdict, the award must be reduced.”  Id. at *17–18. See also Watson 
v. Johnson Mobile Homes, 284 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
that “Mississippi’s statute could not have made Defendant aware that 
their acts . . . would result in a penalty amounting to 175 times 
actual damages”); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, 
L.L.C., 563 S.E.2d 178, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding award 
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some courts have undertaken a direct comparison between comparable 
sanctions and the punitive damages award, many of these courts often 
base their ultimate decision on whether the defendant had fair 
notice.197
Courts have also struggled to determine what constitutes 
comparable sanctions.  Some courts focus on legislative penalties 
while others consider comparable cases.198  For example, in Watson v. 
Johnston Mobile Homes,199 the Fifth Circuit compared the defendants’ 
conduct to Mississippi’s Consumer Protection Act200 and found that the 
punitive damages award dwarfed the comparable penalty for first-time 
offenders.201  The court noted that “[o]f particular relevance here are 
state statutes punishing perpetrators for conduct similar to the 
because “appellants received fair notice not only of the kind of 
conduct that would subject them to punishment, but also of the 
severity of the penalty that might be imposed”).
197
. See Romero v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 674 (1st Cir. 
2000) (stating that “a defendant, through the statutory scheme of 
Title VII and the punitive damages cap figures set out therein, has 
full notice of the potential liability to which it was subject”).
198
. See, e.g., Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83 (“Decided cases are 
relevant, but positive law – statutes and regulations – are even more 
critical.”).
199
. 284 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2002). 
200
. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5(2)(a)-(l) (1972 & Supp. 2001).
201
. See Watson, 284 U.S. at 573–74.
Defendants’ . . . .”202  Other courts have evaluated the size of the 
punitive damages award in light of awards in what they considered to 
be comparable cases.203  For example, in Baker v. National State Bank,204
a New Jersey court upheld a $1.8 million punitive damages award in an 
employment discrimination case.205  The court found that the award 
satisfied constitutional review under the third guidepost because 
“cases indicate[d] to the Bank that it could be liable for punitive 
202
. Id. at 573.  The court compared the defendants’ conduct to 
consumer protection statutes in Alabama and Mississippi, then reduced 
the award from $700,000 to $150,000.  Id. at 574.
203
. See Tillis Trucking Co. v. Moses, 748 So. 2d 874, 890 (Ala. 
1999) (ordering remittitur on $7 million award because it was higher 
than other awards upheld on appeal); Wightman v. Consolidate Rail 
Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 555 (Ohio 1999) (“The far more relevant civil 
‘penalty’ in cases like these is the potential civil damage award in a 
lawsuit.”).  Generally, if courts conduct a comparison of cases, they 
do so only after finding no comparable legislative sanctions are 
available.  See Continental Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 
634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996) (comparing punitive damage award to 
comparable cases because “OXY’s misconduct involved a violation of 
common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison 
with statutory penalties”).
204
. 810 A.2d 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
205
. See id. at 1170.
70 
damages in the neighborhood of a million dollars and at a multiple of 
close to four times compensatory damages.”206
Moreover, some courts have purported to apply the third 
guidepost, yet have blithely disregarded the legislative sanction, 
because they viewed the comparable penalty as being too small.207  In 
Jacque v. Steenburg Homes, the jury awarded $1 in compensatory and 
$100,000 in punitive damages for the defendant’s intentional 
trespass.208  Pursuant to a separate criminal case, a judge fined the 
206
. Id.
207
. See Daka v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 102 (D.C. 1998) (“Because 
of the need to deter future misconduct, . . .  the additional $100,000 
is not so excessive to render the jury’s award unconstitutional . . . 
.”); Jacque v. Steenburg, 563 N.W.2d 154, 165 (Wis. 1997) (stating 
that “the ‘conduct at issue’ here was scarcely that contemplated by 
the legislative action”).
208
. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 158.  In Jacque, Steenberg Homes 
needed to transport a mobile home to a neighbor of the Jaques.  Id. at 
156–57.  The easiest route was across the Jacques’ land, but even 
after multiple requests, the Jacques would not allow Steenberg to 
travel there.  Id. at 157.  The only other route was covered in seven 
feet of snow and contained a sharp turn.  Id.  Despite the Jacques’ 
refusal, Steenberg delivered the mobile home across their property.  
Id.  After the jury trial, Steenberg contested the punitive damages 
award as excessive and unconstitutional, but the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court affirmed.  Id. at 163.  
defendant $30.209  The defendant appealed the punitive damages award to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  That court noted that maximum 
legislative penalty for the conduct at issue was $1,000.210  However, 
the court found the defendant’s conduct to be far more deliberate and 
egregious than that generally contemplated by the legislature.211  As a 
result, it upheld the $100,000 punitive damages award, noting that the 
statute had failed to deter the defendant from engaging in the 
misconduct and that without that level of punitive damages, the 
defendant had “a financial incentive to trespass again.”212  Of course, 
anyone who commits a crime, by definition, has not been deterred by 
the applicable criminal statute.  Thus, such reasoning renders the 
third guidepost illusory.  Furthermore, it seems that such an approach 
usurps the legislature’s considered decision and is contrary to the 
United States Supreme Court’s direction that courts should “accord 
‘substantial deference’ to legislative judgments concerning 
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.”213
209
. Id. at 157.
210
. See id. at 165.  Trespass to land under the Wisconsin 
Criminal Code is a Class B forfeiture.  See Wis. Stat. § 943.13 
(2002).
211
. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 165.
212
. Id.
213
. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus. of 
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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Finally, in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging Inc.,214 the jury 
awarded each plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in 
punitive damages because the motel allowed guests to be assailed by 
bedbugs and did not even warn them of their very likely attacks.  The 
Seventh Circuit recently reviewed that punitive damages award.  The 
parties apparently did not address the third guidepost below and the 
court of appeals concluded that this failing did not nullify the 
punitive damages award.215  Highlighting the disrespect often accorded 
the third guidepost, the court, speaking through Judge Posner, noted 
that comparing criminal and regulatory penalties to the punitive 
damages award was simply an “inquiry recommended by the Supreme 
Court.”216  The Seventh Circuit took judicial notice of the analogous 
penalties and found that an Illinois misdemeanor was comparable.  That 
misdemeanor carried a maximum punishment of one year in prison, a fine 
of $2,500 or both.217  The court recognized that “a corporation cannot 
be sent to prison, and $2,500 is obviously much less than the $186,000 
warded to each plaintiff in this case as punitive damages.”218  Yet the 
court affirmed the award.  
It affirmed the award by relying, in large part, on the fact that 
a municipal ordinance allows for the revocation of a hotel’s business 
license if conditions are unsanitary.  As noted infra,219 this 
justification is unsatisfying, will almost always validate a punitive 
damages award, and thus will often make the third guidepost 
214
 374 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
215 Id., at 678.
216 Id. (emphasis added).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See text at nn. 222-231.
effectively pointless.  The Seventh Circuit’s other technique for 
evading a meaningful application of the third guidepost may be even 
more troubling.  Although the punitive damages award is dramatically 
more than the potential maximum fine, the court stated that “this is 
just the beginning.  Other guests of the hotel were endangered besides 
these two plaintiffs.”220  In other words, the court attempted to 
satisfy the third guidepost by inflating the comparable sanction to 
meet some potential number of violations/victims.  This approach is 
not only counter-factual (no additional victims appear to have brought 
suit), but it would seem to allow all of those additional victims 
(assuming they can marshal the necessary proof) to get $186,000 in 
punitive damages as well.  This is yet another example of how ignoring 
or manipulating the third guidepost can lead to significant problems.  
In fact, one is left with the impression that nearly any award would 
satisfy this court’s vision of the third guidepost.
Because of the wildly divergent approaches taken in response to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW and State Farm, courts need more 
guidance.  At this point, very few courts can undertake a successful 
review of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.  Indeed, 
most courts do little more than note the existence of the third 
guidepost, as they are unable to use it effectively to evaluate 
punitive damages awards.  Perhaps Judge Acker, in his opinion in 
McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc., has made the most accurate 
statements regarding the current state of constitutional review of  
punitive damages after BMW and State Farm: “The court hoped that State 
Farm would provide help for ruling on Metabolife’s claim that the 
220 Id.
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punitive damages imposed in these cases are excessive.  Now the court 
is not sure that the wait was worth it.”221
V. A New Guidance System for the Road Ahead
221
. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 
1228–29 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
The demonstrated problems with the third guidepost are both 
pervasive and severe. The fog and confusion surrounding this 
guidepost, coupled with the weaknesses of other two, reinforce the 
view that the Supreme Court’s current attempt to regulate punitive 
damages truly is a “road to nowhere.”222  Yet it need not be that way.  
The third guidepost can be an integral part of a principled and 
meaningful guidance system for evaluating punitive damages awards.223
We propose a new approach to the third guidepost that will allow 
greater oversight of punitive damages while increasing proportionality 
and retaining flexibility.224  At the same time, it will have the 
222
. BMW, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This is 
particularly problematic because, as noted earlier, punitive damages 
awards are erratic and judicial oversight is important. See supra
note 161.  In fact, one commentator noted that “seventy-five to eighty 
percent of punitive damages awards are eliminated by judges.”
Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 469, 484 
(2001) (remarks of Carl Bogus).
223
. Cf. Priest, supra note 160, at 838 (“Perhaps the most 
helpful metric is the relationship to statutory criminal penalties for 
comparable offenses.”).
224
. If were we writing on a clean slate, we might consider 
other approaches.  For example, we might consider abandoning the 
reliance on the second guidepost of a ratio because it seems to 
improperly focus the inquiry on the injuries of the plaintiff-victim 
as opposed to the intent of and retribution against the defendant-
offender.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected the 
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salutary effect of encouraging the states to become more involved with 
punitive damages awards in a sophisticated and substantial way.
The third guidepost should play a greater role in the analysis of 
whether a punitive damages award violates substantive due process.  
Our proposal for a new understanding of the third guidepost reflects 
the reality of the BMW/State Farm framework and will markedly improve 
its application.  We propose that the third guidepost focus on 
comparable criminal (or civil) monetary fines authorized by statute.  
These fines should be viewed as a “presumptive limit” on the punitive 
damages award.
This new “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost 
would work as follows.  In evaluating the punitive damages award, the 
court would look to comparable criminal or civil monetary fines that 
are statutorily authorized.  The highest comparable fine would be the 
presumptive limit on the punitive damages.  If the punitive damages 
award provided by the jury was smaller than this presumptive limit, 
use of a ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages as a 
factor to determine whether a punitive damages award is excessive for 
that reason.  See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] S.C.R. 595, 656 
(stating, “that relationship  . . . is not even the most relevant 
because it puts the focus on the plaintiff’s loss rather than where it 
should be, on the defendant’s misconduct”).  Furthermore, we question 
whether it is a worthwhile use of the limited resources of the federal 
judiciary to return to the “Lochneresque” economic substantive due 
process analysis.   See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of 
Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 917, 968 (1999).
the third guidepost would present no bar to the imposition of the 
award.  Of course, the punitive damages award must still survive the 
scrutiny of the first two guideposts before it would pass 
constitutional muster.225  Nevertheless, passing the third guidepost 
would often be suggestive of a constitutionally permissible punitive 
damages award.
If, however, the punitive damages award is larger than the 
presumptive limit, the third guidepost would not be satisfied.  
Failing the third guidepost would be a strong indication, but not a 
guarantee, that the punitive damages award is unconstitutionally 
excessive.  If the punitive damages award fails the third guidepost 
and has an unacceptably large ratio, the award would be 
unconstitutional in virtually all cases.  If, however, the punitive 
damages award fails the third guidepost but has an acceptable ratio 
pursuant to the second guidepost, the court would concentrate on the 
first guidepost’s inquiry into reprehensibility.  In setting the 
225
. As noted, there are weaknesses in the first two guideposts, 
see supra text at nn. 160–177, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
abandon them.  Furthermore, these first two guideposts can play a more 
meaningful role once the third guidepost is reformed as we propose.  
Given the concrete structure afforded by our “presumptive limit” 
approach to the third guidepost, the first two guideposts are 
substantially cabined.  As such, their previous weakness of 
unrestrained malleability becomes a benefit of controlled flexibility.  
Thus, our proposal sets forth a realistic path for improving the 
Supreme Court’s approach to evaluating punitive damages awards.
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statutory maximum fine that fixes the presumptive limit, the relevant 
legislature has spoken to the misconduct’s reprehensibility already.226
Thus, it will be difficult, but not impossible, to conclude that the 
misconduct is so reprehensible as to justify a punitive damages award 
greater than the presumptive limit set by the legislature.  Indeed, we 
believe that this conclusion is appropriate only in cases of 
overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct falls outside of 
all bounds of decency.
We will demonstrate that this new presumptive limit approach to 
the third guidepost is largely consistent with (yet more easily 
applicable than) the Supreme Court’s general views on the subject, 
satisfies the due process need for notice, is respectful of federalism 
concerns, and allows for greater proportionality and nuance while 
evaluating punitive damages awards. 
Our conception of the third guidepost is largely consistent with 
the views of Justice O’Connor, on whose opinions in Browning-Ferris
and TXO the guideposts are based.227  In her opinion, she stressed, 
“the reviewing court must accord ‘substantial deference’ to 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct 
at issue.”228  She also noted, “because punitive damages are penal in 
226
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“The existence of a 
criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a 
State views the wrongful action.”).
227
. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300–01 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228
. Id. at 301.
nature, the court should compare the civil and criminal penalties 
imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and 
the civil and criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions 
for the same and similar conduct.”229  Justice O’Connor’s approach to 
this comparison is extraordinarily broad.  She noted that “[i]n 
identifying the relevant criminal penalties, the court should consider 
not only the possible monetary sanctions, but also any possible prison 
term.”230  She expanded upon these assertions in TXO, noting, “jury 
awards in similar cases and the civil and penalties created by the 
legislature for like conduct can give us some idea of the limits of 
retribution.”231
Justice O’Connor’s statements provide a good foundation for the 
proper interpretation of the third guidepost.  However, her views miss 
the mark concerning the role of comparable non-fine sanctions, the 
importance of penalties imposed instead of penalties authorized, and 
the value of practices in different jurisdictions.
Comparing punitive damages awards to non-monetary criminal 
punishments is fatally flawed.  It would effectively eviscerate the 
third guidepost because such punishments are not meaningfully 
comparable to monetary fines.  The most common incomparable punishment 
is imprisonment.  Incarceration simply does not translate in a helpful 
way to a monetary punitive damages award, particularly in the United 
229
. Id. (emphasis in original). 
230
. Id. at 300.
231
. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 483 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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States.232  Any nontrivial potential term of imprisonment would likely 
justify almost any size punitive damages awards.233  For example, 
232
. Fines are not used much in the American criminal system, 
but are the primary means of sanction in the civil justice system.  
Part of the reason for this is a distinctly American belief that 
nothing short of prison is proper punishment.  See Dan M. Kahan, 
Punishment Incommensurability, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 691, 691 (1998) 
(stating that “the United States relies excessively on imprisonment”); 
Hannah T.S. Long, The “Inequability” of Incarceration, 31 Colum. J.L. 
& Soc. Probs. 321, 324–35 (1998) (stating that “incarceration remains 
by far our most common punishment for serious offenses”); Steven A. 
Hatfield, Criminal Punishment in America: From the Colonial to the 
Modern Era, 1 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 139, 152 (1990) (describing prison 
as the “primary means of criminal punishment in the United States”).  
The United States, unlike western European countries, relies on 
incarceration almost exclusively.  See Michael Tonry, Parochialism in 
U.S. Sentencing Policy, 45 Crime & Delinquency 48, 48–49 (1999).  See 
also Dennis M. Ryan, Note, Criminal Fines: A Sentencing Alternative to 
Short-Term Incarceration, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1285, 1286 (1983) (“The 
United States incarcerates a greater percentage of its population than 
any other western democracy.”).  Particularly over the past few 
decades, Western European countries have implemented fines and 
community service orders as alternatives to United States-style 
mandatory sentences and imprisonment.  See Tonry, supra, at 48–49. 
courts have justified punitive damages awards of $500,000 based on a 
possible twenty-five year prison term,234 $1.5 million based on a ten 
to forty year prison term,235 and $17.9 million based on a maximum ten 
years in prison.236  Similarly, the potential loss of a business 
license, if seriously considered, will dwarf virtually all punitive 
damages.237  This is the “nuclear option,” one which would completely 
destroy a defendant’s business.  A mere punitive damages award pales 
233
. See Aken v. Plains Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002) (“The possibility of a 
jail sentence justifies a substantial punitive damages award.”).
234
. See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997) (comparing 
conviction for first degree sodomy with $500,000 punitive damages 
award).
235
. Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1998) (comparing 
conviction for kidnaping with $1.5 million punitive damages award).
236
. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 972 
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (comparing legislative sanctions for fraud with 
punitive damages award).  The court in Eden eventually reduced the 
$17.9 million punitive damages award because it was not constitutional 
under the first two guideposts.  Id. at *16. 
237
. In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the Ohio 
Supreme Court noted, “The loss of Anthem’s license to engage in the 
business of insurance in Ohio would certainly be a catastrophic 
punishment far outstripping the award in this case.”  781 N.E.2d 121, 
143 (Ohio 2002).
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in comparison.238  Our approach, focusing on criminal (or civil) fines 
rather than imprisonment or other non-monetary sanctions, would 
further both practical concerns and law reform goals.  Some 
commentators have argued that imprisonment is generally not necessary, 
and rarely available, for those defendants most likely to be assessed 
substantial punitive damages awards.239  Furthermore, as discussed 
238
. The only award that would come close is a punitive damages 
award that itself would bankrupt the company, but such an award would 
likely be invalid.  See e.g., City Stores Co. v. Mazzaferro, 342 So.2d 
827, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that punitive damages 
should “hurt, not bankrupt,” defendant); Hazelwood v. Illinois Central 
Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. 1983) (“Punitive damages should 
be large enough to provide retribution and deterrence but should not 
be so large that the award destroys the defendant.”);  Darcars Motors 
of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 818 A.2d 1159, 1181 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2003) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to bankrupt or 
impoverish a defendant . . . .”); see also 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra
note 27, at § 18:08 (noting that while punitive damages should punish 
and deter, they “should not be so burdensome as to ruin the 
defendant”).
239
. See Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive 
Damages, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 241, 258 n.127 (1985) (stating that 
“incarceration normally is not needed in the punitive damages 
defendant’s case since he is not the type of person that needs to be 
incapacitated until he can safely return to society”).
below, our approach would also encourage legislatures to take criminal 
fines more seriously. 
Justice O’Connor’s interest in punishments imposed instead of 
punishments authorized neglects the importance of the legislative 
judgments she otherwise champions.  It is the view of the legislature 
that is entitled to “substantial deference,”240 not that of sentencing 
judges or juries in other cases.  The idea here is to provide a 
framework for punitive damages that is more objective and less 
dependent upon the vagaries and unpredictabilities of particular 
cases.  Were the result otherwise, one aberrational, yet unchallenged 
(perhaps settled out-of-court), award or sentence could skew future 
punitive damages awards for years.
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor and the BMW Court have been 
internally inconsistent by instructing courts to compare punitive 
damages awards to comparable sanctions that could be imposed in other 
jurisdictions.241  This view is in tension with the Court’s teaching 
that out of state conduct cannot form the basis for a punitive damages 
240
. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see also State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (comparing punitive 
damages award to “relevant civil sanction”).
241
. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584 (comparing punitive damages award 
to maximum civil penalty in Alabama and other states); Browning-
Ferris, 492 U.S. at 301 (noting that courts should compare punitive 
damages awards to legislative penalties “imposed by different 
jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct”).
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award.242  Indeed, looking to other jurisdictions minimizes the value 
of state sovereignty.  One state’s choice to authorize a sanction for 
a specific action should not justify an award in a different state.  
Moreover, using awards in other states does not satisfy the Court’s 
concern with fair notice.243  Defendants acting in one state are not 
put on notice that they can be awarded punitive damages according to 
the law of another state.
Despite the differences in application, our new approach to the 
third guidepost draws considerable strength from Justice O’Connor’s 
views.  For example, her decision to center the inquiry on comparable 
criminal (or civil) punishments is logical and appropriate.  The 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that punitive damages awards, while 
arguably lacking the stigma of a criminal conviction, do constitute 
punishment.244  Their role as punishment distinguishes them from 
242
. See 517 U.S. at 572.
243
. See supra, notes 188–191.  Also, the Court in State Farm
noted that juries cannot use out of state conduct to justify the 
amount of a punitive damages award.  123 S. Ct. at 1522 (“Any proper 
adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons 
would require their inclusion, and . . . would need to apply the laws 
of their relevant jurisdiction.”).  If juries cannot use conduct in 
other states to justify the amount, reviewing courts should not care 
about how other states punish.
244
. Cf. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 (holding that punitive 
damages awards are not governed by the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines provision).  Since Browning-Ferris, however, some courts have 
compensatory awards, which are intended to indemnify the plaintiff.245
“[T]hey are private fines levied by civil juries to punish 
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”246  Punitive 
altered their punitive damages laws, redirecting a portion of the 
award away from the plaintiff to benefit the state.  See, e.g., 
Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146 
(Ohio 2002) (dividing up the $30 million punitive damages award so 
that $10 million went to plaintiff, then allotting portion for his 
litigation and attorney’s fees, and allocating remaining amount to “a 
place that will achieve a societal good . . . a state institution”).  
The government’s receipt of these funds may invoke review under the 
Eighth Amendment.  See Janet v. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus 
Plaintiffs’ Rights: The Constitutional Battle over Statutory 
Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 405, 417–18 
(1995) (discussing states’ restriction of punitive damages awards).
245
. See David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A 
Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 369,  [needed for 
quote] (1965) (“The objective of the civil law . . . has been 
indemnification of the complainant.”).
246
. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). See 
also Mathias v. Accor Economy Loadging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)(“The term ‘punitive damages’ implies 
punishment . . . .”).
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damages have been described by as “quasi-criminal,”247 and as 
“punishment.”248  Multiple times, the Court has noted that the primary 
justifications for imposing any punitive damages award are retribution 
and deterrence, the same theories used to support criminal 
punishments.249  Also, while the stigma of a punitive damages award 
might not equal that accompanying a criminal conviction, “there is a 
stigma attached that does not accompany a purely compensatory 
award.”250  Therefore, our approach to the third guidepost of treating 
247
. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
432 (2001) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 
(1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
248
. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
249
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519 (“[P]unitive damages 
serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and 
retribution....”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in 
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”); see also 
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice
1284 (2002) (“The dominant approaches to [criminal] justification are 
retributive and utilitarian.”).
250
. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  One 
commentator has even noted, “[P]unitive damages may be a far more 
severe punishment than a criminal fine carrying the stigma effect of 
social condemnation.”  Grass, supra note 213, at 252; cf. Comment, 
Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 408, 411 (1967) (“The one criminal punishment which approximates 
statutory maximum fines as a “presumptive limit” is wholly consistent 
with the Court’s long-standing views about the general nature of 
punitive damages.
Finally, this approach to the third guidepost is compatible with 
State Farm.  In fact, it reflects the most logical and useful 
interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s cryptic comment in State Farm
about using  criminal penalties in determining the constitutionality 
of punitive damages awards.251  His opinion implies that punitive 
damages awards should not exceed comparable criminal sanctions.252
Further, he recognizes that, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
some punitive damages awards must be lower than comparable sanctions, 
since they are not subject to the same protections as criminal 
actions.253  Punitive damages are easily comparable to criminal fines,254
the form of punitive damages is the criminal fine.  But the fine, 
unlike punitive damages, still carries the full weight of stigma 
associated with criminal convictions.”).
251
. See supra note 182.
252
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“[T]he remote 
possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a 
punitive damages award.”).
253
. See id. (“Great care must be taken to avoid use of the 
civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only 
after the heightened protections of a criminal trail have been 
observed, including, of course, its higher standard of proof.”).
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but lack the safeguards of criminal proceedings, and are thus easier 
to impose.  Criminal defendants enjoy many rights not available to 
those defendants facing civil proceedings.255  First, criminal 
defendants are protected against compelled self-incrimination by the 
Fifth Amendment.256  Second, prosecutors in criminal trials face a 
254
. See Comment, supra note 236, at  411 (“The one criminal 
punishment which approximates the form of punitive damages is the 
criminal fine.”).
255
. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive 
Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1455 (1993) 
(stating that “punitive civil law omits many of the most prominent 
protections embodied in criminal law, and thus it appears to permit 
the infliction of punishment without constitutional safeguards”).
256
. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . 
.”).  Also, while civil juries may make negative inferences against 
those defendants who remain silent, criminal juries may not.  Compare 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (“[T]he Fifth 
Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is 
evidence of guilt.”) with Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) 
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against 
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to 
probative evidence offered against them . . . .”).
higher burden of proof than plaintiffs in civil actions.257  Third, 
unlike a criminal defendant, a civil defendant has no right to 
constitutionally effective counsel,258 a unanimous verdict,259 or the 
protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.260  Thus, as Justice Kennedy 
257
. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that, in 
criminal trials, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”); cf.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (rejecting 
appellant’s argument that higher standard of proof than “preponderance 
of the evidence” was constitutionally mandated).
258
. See U.S. Const. amend VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.”); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that “the right to counsel is the right 
to effective assistance of counsel”).  Cf. Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 
775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) (“There is no constitutional or statutory 
right for an indigent to have effective assistance of counsel in a 
civil case.”).
259
. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 635 n.5 (explaining due 
process requirement of unanimous verdict in federal trials).  Many 
states recognize guarantee criminal defendants the right to unanimous 
verdicts in jury trials, but are not constitutionally mandated to do 
so.  See id.
260
. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
90 
noted in State Farm, “[g]reat care must be taken to avoid the use of 
the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed 
only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been 
observed . . . .”261
The new “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost would 
also satisfy the Supreme Court’s due process concerns about notice. 
The Court’s exploration of this notice function in BMW and State Farm 
was one of the few things that lower courts have been able to discern 
as central to the third guidepost.262  The Supreme Court has noted the 
importance of fair notice to ensure the constitutionality of punitive 
damages awards multiple times.263  As Justice O’Connor observed in her 
punishments inflicted.”).  See also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont 
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (holding that punitive 
damages awards are not subject to Excessive Fines Clause).  For a 
further discussion of Browning-Ferris, please see supra notes 42–49 
and accompanying text.
261
. 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
262
. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 
70 (1st Cir. 2001).  For a further discussion of Zimmerman and lower 
court’s focus on the notice requirement, see supra notes 188–191 and 
accompanying text.
263
. In State Farm, the Court noted, “‘[E]lementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a 
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject 
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a 
State will impose.’” 123 S.Ct. at 1520 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 574).  
dissent in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, “A State can 
have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so 
arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based 
solely upon bias or whim.”264  Wildly unpredictable awards, by 
definition, do not provide fair notice.265  If a defendant has no idea 
The Court also noted the importance of notice in its discussion of the 
standard of review for punitive damages awards. Cooper Indus. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,  532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (quoting BMW, 
517 U.S. at 587, (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Requiring the application 
of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more than simply 
provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment 
. . . .”).
264
. 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
265
. Some scholars advocate unpredictable punitive damages 
awards as the only means to effectively punish and deter wrongdoers.   
One court noted that, “with a definite idea of the amount of punitive 
damages that could be assessed against it, a wrongdoer would be 
capable of building the cost of the penalty into the cost of the 
product, at the same time maintaining low standards of product quality 
or business behavior.”  Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission 
Coop., 49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002) (citing  Sajevic, supra note 9, at 
547).  However, encouraging unpredictable punitive damages awards 
directly contradicts not only recent Supreme Court decisions, but the 
fundamental theories behind common law negligence as well. Negligence 
is usually determined “by balancing the risk, in the light of the 
social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and 
92 
of the general magnitude of the award that can be imposed against him 
or her, the defendant has insufficient notice of the award.266  The 
“presumptive limit” approach provides notice by tying most acceptable 
punitive damages awards to clear, published statutory maximum fines. 
In addition to furthering the Supreme Court’s views on the need 
for notice, the “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost 
would allow the states to play a significant and nuanced role in 
guiding punitive damages awards.  States would have the opportunity to 
provide significant input into the guidance system for punitive 
damages awards.267  By setting a statutory maximum fine for a 
particular offense, states would be sending a clear message about the 
extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor 
is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued.”  
William L. Prosser & W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 31 (5th ed. 1984); see also United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 12–13 (1947) (discussing cost-benefit analysis to 
determine negligence).  Unpredictable punitive damages awards would 
undermine this cost/benefit analysis.
266
. See Watson v. Johnston Mobile Homes, 284 F.3d 568, 574 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (concluding that comparable legislative sanction “could not 
have made Defendants aware that their acts of fraud, conversion, and 
intentional breach of contract would result in a penalty amounting to 
175 times actual damages”).
267
. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“The existence of a 
criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a 
State views the wrongful action.”).
reprehensibility of that conduct, which would also be relevant for the 
first guidepost, while also fixing the “presumptive limit” for 
punitive damages awards based on that conduct.
Our “presumptive limit” approach would lead to legislatively-
guided proportionality, not unpredictability.  This tack is more 
sophisticated than mere pre-set state-law caps on punitive damages 
awards.  Most states that cap damages use one of two methods.268  One 
approach is to implement a flat cap that prohibits punitive damages 
above a particular dollar amount.269  Another approach is to cap 
punitive damages at some multiple of compensatory damages.270  Neither 
268
. See generally BMW, 517 U.S. at 614–619 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (listing state statutes limiting punitive damages awards); 
see also Developments in the Law–The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1752, 1793–94 (2000) (surveying state legislative 
punitive damages reform).
269
. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3701(e) (2002) (limiting 
punitive damages awards to “the lesser of the annual gross income 
earned by the defendant . . . or $5 million,” whichever is lower); Va. 
Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2003) (“In no event shall the total 
amount awarded for punitive damages exceed $350,000.”).
270
. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (2002) (limiting 
punitive damages awards to three times compensatory damages in all 
actions); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240b (2003) (limiting punitive damages 
awards to twice compensatory damages in products liability actions).
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of these approaches is satisfactory.271  The specific dollar cap, to be 
meaningful, will logically be set at a level appropriate for either 
the average or the most common misconduct sparking punitive damages.  
Those defendants engaging in conduct that is less offensive than 
average may be subject to punitive damages in excess of what the 
legislature might think is appropriate.  In contrast, those defendants 
engaging in conduct that is more offensive than average may not be
subject to as large a punitive damages award as the legislature might 
deem appropriate.  As for multiplier caps, they suffer from one of the 
same weaknesses as the second or ratio guidepost, that is they focus 
attention on the victim instead of on the offender.272  Not only are 
these multiplier caps crude (in a way similar to flat caps), but they 
are also not able to address situations of grave misconduct resulting 
in low compensatory damages.  Furthermore, civil caps on punitive 
damages would continue to allow private civil punishment to exceed 
271
. See Sunstein et al., supra note 37, at 218 (noting that 
“caps on damages may function to increase some award amounts because 
they also can serve as anchors . . . .” ).  With a general punitive 
damages cap, punishments will rarely be proportionate.  Instead, many 
defendants, whether their actions were malicious or reckless, and 
without a substantive inquiry into the amount of harm caused, will be 
assessed the same amount of punitive damages.
272
. See, e.g., President’s Council on Competitiveness’ 1992 
Model State Punitive Damages Act (no more than equal to compensatory); 
Lori S. Nugent, Punitive Damages 29 (2002); see also supra note 15.
public criminal punishment, contrary to the proper understanding of 
Justice Kennedy’s State Farm opinion.273
Unlike these kinds of flat or multiplier caps, the “presumptive 
limit” approach allows for finer gradations of legislative input. The 
legislature is not pushed to set a one-size-fits-all cap on punitive 
damages.  Some torts – like some crimes – are far more reprehensible 
and therefore deserving of greater punishment.  Encouraging the 
legislature to address the possible criminal sanctions gives it a 
chance to express its views on the reprehensibility of the conduct.274
273
. It is beyond of the scope of this piece to explore the 
distinction between private and public (i.e., government initiated) 
civil actions, except to note that such public civil actions are often 
viewed as remedial.  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1302 (1976) (noting that public 
law litigation is traditionally viewed as broadly remedial); see also
Thomas C. Gray, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1245 (2001) 
(describing public civil actions, including public regulatory 
enforcement using civil penalties, as “remedial hybrids”).
274
. State governments have the responsibility to set limits.  
By doing so, legislatures reinforce moral condemnation associated with 
punitive damages awards.  See supra, note 169.  Simply setting 
punitive caps on a tort arguably would not maintain alignment between 
moral condemnation and punitive damages.  One commentator has noted 
that “statutory penalties often are outdated and obsolete[, and] 
rarely are adjusted for inflation.”  See Kimberly A. Pace, 
Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive Damages 
96 
Using legislative criminal sanctions as a presumptive limit on 
punitive damages also remains in line with the basic tenets of 
federalism by moving law-making decisions from the jury back to the 
legislature.275  Through our approach, legislatures have an incentive 
Reform, 46 Am. U.L. Rev. 1573, 1605 (1997).  However, this should not 
preclude courts from using the legislative sanction as a presumptive 
cap.  It is the job of the legislature, not the courts, to make the 
law, and legislatures are free to adjust statutory penalties to 
reflect inflation and public opinion.  “As in the criminal sentencing 
context, legislatures enjoy broad discretion in authorizing and 
limiting permissible punitive damages awards.”  Cooper Indus. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001).
275
. As one commentator noted: 
[E]ven though judges review punitive awards for 
excessiveness and many state legislatures have recently 
imposed caps limiting their size, juries exercise an 
alarmingly vast amount of power in awarding punitive 
damages.  The lessons of separation of powers, 
especially as applied in the criminal law, teach that 
such a concentration of power in any one entity in the 
punishment process is dangerous and encourages arbitrary 
results. 
See Murphy, supra note 9, at 502–03; cf. Sunstein et al., supra note 
37, at 2124 n.187 (“[J]uries do, of course, have some control over 
to more finely calibrate their judgment as to reprehensibility and 
proportionality, thereby helping to create workable guidelines for 
assessing punitive damages awards.276
sentencing through their choices among different theories of criminal 
liability.”).
276
. An additional benefit of our approach is that it may 
motivate legislatures to engage in criminal sentencing reform.  It may 
even spark a renewed interest in non-incarcerative punishments for 
some criminal acts.
There has been a small renewed interest in criminal fines.  The 
1994 ABA Criminal Justice Sentencing Standards “take a more aggressive 
view toward the use of fines as criminal sanctions than the prior 
edition.” Criminal Justice Sentencing Standards 18-3.16 (History of 
Standard) (3rd ed. 1994).  The ABA encourages fines to be available in 
all cases, for both individual and organization offenders.  Id. at 18-
3.16(a).  A collateral benefit to this analysis would be an increased 
awareness of the value of criminal fines.
When used appropriately, fines can advance punitive objectives on 
an incremental scale, and can also further the goals of general and 
specific deterrence. . . .[T]here has been growing recognition that 
fines historically imposed on organizations have been too small to 
deter organizational criminality.  There has thus been movement in the 
law toward higher fine schedules for organizational offenders.
Id. at 18-3.16 (Commentary).  In fact, Delaware and other states 
have recently increased the possible punishment for organizations.  
See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 4208 (2003) (signed into law by Governor 
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Our approach to the third guidepost provides courts with a 
powerful and useful analytical tool.  We have demonstrated that lower 
courts, by treating statutory maximum fines as a “presumptive limit,” 
will be acting in accordance with the broad guidance of the Supreme 
Court, protecting substantive due process rights of defendants, and, 
consistent with the statements of the Court, respecting federalism 
concerns.  Beyond those important benefits, there is a very practical 
advantage for lower courts.  The “presumptive limit” approach is easy 
to apply and will likely increase uniformity.
Our approach offers lower courts a simple and objective starting 
point – a statutory maximum fine.  Unlike the other two guideposts, 
June 30, 2003); see also Cris Barrish & Steven Church, For 
Corporations, a Criminal Conviction May Mean Small ‘Nes, But Larger 
Consequences for Business, News Journal (Wilmington, Del.) June 28, 
2003 at 19A (discussing implementation of larger fines for 
corporations in Delaware and other states).
It is unrealistic to expect that legislatures will suddenly start 
to view economic sanctions as a viable alternative to imprisonment.  
However, the use of criminal fines as presumptive limits for punitive 
damages awards may  encourage more extensive incorporation of fines in 
sentencing, perhaps reducing the reliance on incarceration, 
particularly for non-violent offenses.  See generally Long, supra note 
206, at 324–47; Ryan, supra note 206, at 1285.  One possibility might 
be for legislatures to promote the increased use of criminal fines in 
conjunction with incarceration terms of shorter duration for certain 
offenses.
the properly understood third guidepost does not demand that judges 
turn to intuition and vague notions of justice.  Given this common 
starting point, courts are more likely to treat roughly comparable 
punitive damages awards, based on roughly comparable conduct within a 
particular jurisdiction, in a more uniform fashion.  While the 
BMW/State Farm guideposts are not meant to yield a precise formula, 
the “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost will bring 
much needed structure to the process.
There are some potential factual scenarios that might raise 
questions under our “presumptive limit” approach to the third 
guidepost.  These scenarios, reflecting either excessive action or 
complete inaction on the part of the states, do not ultimately detract 
from the value of the “presumptive limit” approach.  
One point that might be raised is what should happen if states 
respond to the new “presumptive limit” approach by setting multi-
million dollar maximum criminal fines for every offense, no matter how 
trivial.  This issue will not be problematic.  As noted above, passing 
the third guidepost does not obviate the need to consider the other 
two guideposts.  While a high statutory maximum will inform an 
evaluation of the first guidepost, it does not compel the outcome.  
The second guidepost must also be considered and the higher the 
punitive damages award, the higher – and more suspect – the ratio.  
Furthermore, there are separate restraints on a state’s ability to set 
a maximum criminal fine.  While it is a weak restraint,277 there is a 
277
. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) 
(upholding mandatory sentence of life in prison for cocaine possession 
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separate constitutional upper limit on criminal punishments.  Any 
legislatively imposed criminal fine must satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.278
and holding, “[T]he Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality 
guarantee”); Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional 
Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 
106 (1995) (describing Court’s holdings regarding constitutional 
limits on punishment as “limited” and “inconsistent”); see also Adam 
M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality 
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal 
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 Va. L. Rev. 
1249, 1263–64 (2000) (“[W]hile proportionality review of excessive 
criminal punishment survives, successful challenges are nearly 
impossible.”). 
278
. The Eighth Amendment limits the government’s power to 
impose fines as punishment.  United States v. Bajakjian, 524 U.S. 321, 
328 (1998).  The Court in Bajakjian noted, “The amount of the 
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense 
that it is designed to punish,” and held, “[A] punitive forfeiture 
violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional 
to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”  Id. at 334.   
The precise connection between the way in which courts deal with 
excessive criminal punishments and excessive punitive damages may 
appropriately be noted but is beyond the scope of this piece. See
generally Gershowitz, supra note 263.  Perhaps in light of the clearer 
legislative role under our approach to the third guidepost, the 
A second potential concern revolves around how to deal with the 
fact that many criminal offenses currently carry statutory maximum 
fines that may be viewed as very low.  Given the current state of 
criminal punishment in America, it would not be surprising to find 
potential monetary fines that seem low, particularly in comparison to 
potential terms of imprisonment.279  First and foremost, our 
“presumptive limit” approach would provide states with an incentive to 
reassess their monetary fine structure.280  If, however, a state does 
not change a seemingly low statutory maximum fine, it has made a 
choice that should be respected.  Second, if a punitive damages award 
exceeds the seemingly low statutory maximum fine, it will not satisfy 
the third guidepost.  Nevertheless, as discussed supra, running afoul 
of the third guidepost does not guarantee that the punitive damages 
award is unconstitutionally excessive.  Although it would be very 
difficult for a court to uphold a punitive damages award that exceeds 
the “presumptive limit,” it would be possible.  If the court found 
Supreme Court would take a less aggressive stance in evaluating 
punitive damages awards, which would be more consistent with its 
approach to prison terms.  See id. at 1263–64 (stating that 
“successful challenges [of sentences of imprisonment] are  nearly 
impossible”).
279
. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-3 (Michie 2003) 
(authorizing 45–65 year sentence and up to $10,000 fine as sentence 
for murder).
280
. See supra note 265 (discussing potential additional 
benefits of sparking fuller sentencing reform).
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overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct was outside of all 
bounds of decency, the award might be sustained.  This high burden on 
a punitive damages award that exceeds the “presumptive limit” is 
justified in part because the state’s legislative judgment about the 
reprehensibility of the conduct is entitled to “substantial 
deference.”  Furthermore, a punitive damages award in excess of the 
“presumptive limit” raises serious concerns about a defendant’s notice 
of the potential punishment.  While the state’s judgment cannot 
automatically equate to constitutional propriety, exceeding it is a 
strong indication in this circumstance of a punitive damages award 
that is out of bounds.281
Finally, a similar potential question is how courts should 
respond when the state has not provided a criminal (or civil) 
punishment for particular misconduct.  This issue should arise in 
extremely few circumstances.  When the conduct at issue is not a 
crime, but is instead, for example, a common law tort, courts should 
focus on the first two guideposts, reprehensibility and ratio.  
However, the court should note the legislature’s failure to 
criminalize the conduct while conducting the reprehensibility 
analysis.282  Similar to the situation of a seemingly low statutory 
281
. It is not revolutionary for a constitutional test to vary 
according to the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurs.  Cf. Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (addressing constitutional 
standards for obscenity).
282
. For example, an Alabama court was unable to conduct the 
comparative analysis in AutoZone, Inc. v. Leonard, 812 So. 2d 1179, 
maximum fine, discussed supra, the state has made a choice.  As 
Justice Kennedy observed in State Farm, “[T]he existence of a criminal 
penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a state views 
the wrongful action.”283  Because the conduct is not a crime, it is 
unlikely to be considered reprehensible enough to justify a punitive 
damages award.  Once again, there are notice concerns as the defendant 
would not even know that certain conduct warranted punishment.  Courts 
seeking to approve punitive damages in such circumstances would have 
to demonstrate what makes this case so unusual as to support punitive 
damages.  The presumption in our “presumptive limit” approach can be 
overcome, but it should not be overcome easily.  Up to this point, 
most courts have only paid lip service to the third guidepost.  Under 
the “presumptive limit” approach, however, more than that would be 
needed to allow a punitive damages award that exceeds the presumptive 
limit.
Our new “presumptive limit” approach provides a logical and 
beneficial interpretation of the Supreme Court’s attitudes toward the 
1188 (Ala. 2001).  The court noted, “[w]e cannot consider this 
guidepost, because Alabama law provides no sanctions, either civil or 
criminal, for a retaliatory discharge other than the remedy Leonard 
pursued through his civil action . . . .”  Id.  The court then 
analyzed the award using the first two BMW guideposts, finding the 
$275,000 award constitutional.  Autozone, 812 So. 2d at 1187–88.  The 
punitive damages award was 3.67 times the compensatory award.  Id. at 
1187.
283
. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
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third guidepost.  While no court has explicitly adopted this 
reasoning, a few decisions have pointed toward this general path in 
the wake of BMW.  In United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc.,284 for 
example, an apartment complex owner and management company were sued 
for discriminating based on race.285  A jury awarded the individual 
plaintiffs $1,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive 
damages, $50,000 against each defendant.286  The Eighth Circuit 
compared the statutory penalties under the Fair Housing Act287 to the 
$50,000 punitive damages awards against each defendants.288  The court 
approved the $50,000 punitive damages award in part because it did not 
exceed the maximum civil penalty permitted for a first time offense.289
More recently, in Lincoln v. Case,290 the Fifth Circuit was faced 
with a comparable housing discrimination case.  The jury awarded the 
plaintiff $500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive 
damages.  On appeal, the defendants challenged the award as being 
excessive.  Under the first guidepost, the court found that the 
284
. 184 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999).
285
. See id. at 928.
286
. See id. at 933.
287
. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19.
288
. See Big D Enterprises,184 F.2d at 933.  
289
. See id. (“The fact that the FHA permits courts to impose a 
fine up to $50,000 in addition to compensatory and punitive damages 
significantly undercuts appellants’ argument that the punitive damage 
award in this case is excessive.”).
290
. 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003).
defendants’ conduct was reprehensible.291  Next, the court noted that 
the ratio from the second guidepost—here 200 to 1 -- exceeded the 
State Farm goal of a single digit multiplier.  Yet the court was 
persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the “ratio in this case is 
justifiable given the ‘inherently low or hard-to- determine actual 
injuries’ in housing discrimination cases and the important goal of 
deterring future wrongdoing.”292  Finally, with respect to the third 
guidepost, the court observed that the statutory maximum civil penalty
is $55,000 for a first-time offense comparable to what was 
demonstrated in this case.  After evaluating the State Farm/BMW
approach, in which the punitive damages award clearly violated only 
the third guidepost, the Fifth Circuit remitted the award to the 
statutory maximum civil penalty of $55,000 “in order to comport with 
due process.”293  Ultimately, the court concluded that “in this case a 
punitive damages award coextensive with the statutory maximum civil 
penalty is reasonable and proportionate to the wrong committed.”294
291
. Id. at 293.
292
. Id. at 293–294.
293
. Id. at 294.
294
. Id. (citing Big D. Enterprises).  Although the Lincoln
court cited to and quoted from Big D. Enterprises, the Lincoln court 
analysis was closer to our presumptive limit approach because it more 
clearly approved of the award under the first two guideposts but not 
the third and reduced the award accordingly.
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VI.  Conclusion
Through BMW and State Farm, the Supreme Court has attempted to 
restrain punitive damages awards.  Unfortunately, lower courts have 
been unable to apply the guideposts consistently, especially regarding 
the third guidepost, evaluating the punitive damages award and 
comparable legislative sanctions.  Because of these uncertainties, 
punitive damages awards still lack meaningful review.  Our approach, 
using legislatively determined maximum fines and penalties for 
comparable misconduct as a “presumptive limit” on punitive damages 
awards, solves this problem, giving lower courts the guidance they 
need.  This nuanced and proportionate approach not only provides civil 
defendants with fair notice of potential punitive damages awards, it 
also reinforces the proposition that important lawmaking authority 
belongs in the hands of state legislatures and gives increased value 
and meaning to the Supreme Court’s holdings in BMW and State Farm.
